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From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
To: Tuong Tong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>,
	Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>,
	"davem@davemloft.net" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"jmaloy@redhat.com" <jmaloy@redhat.com>,
	"maloy@donjonn.com" <maloy@donjonn.com>,
	"ying.xue@windriver.com" <ying.xue@windriver.com>,
	"netdev@vger.kernel.org" <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "tipc-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net" 
	<tipc-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [net] tipc: fix using smp_processor_id() in preemptible
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 14:48:00 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3f858962-4e38-0b72-4341-1304ec03cd7a@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <AM8PR05MB7332E91A67120D78823353F6E2510@AM8PR05MB7332.eurprd05.prod.outlook.com>



On 8/31/20 3:05 AM, Tuong Tong Lien wrote:
> 
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
>> Sent: Monday, August 31, 2020 4:48 PM
>> To: Tuong Tong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>; Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>; davem@davemloft.net;
>> jmaloy@redhat.com; maloy@donjonn.com; ying.xue@windriver.com; netdev@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: tipc-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net
>> Subject: Re: [net] tipc: fix using smp_processor_id() in preemptible
>>
>>
>>
>> On 8/31/20 1:33 AM, Tuong Tong Lien wrote:
>>> Hi Eric,
>>>
>>> Thanks for your comments, please see my answers inline.
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
>>>> Sent: Monday, August 31, 2020 3:15 PM
>>>> To: Tuong Tong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>; davem@davemloft.net; jmaloy@redhat.com; maloy@donjonn.com;
>>>> ying.xue@windriver.com; netdev@vger.kernel.org
>>>> Cc: tipc-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net
>>>> Subject: Re: [net] tipc: fix using smp_processor_id() in preemptible
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 8/29/20 12:37 PM, Tuong Lien wrote:
>>>>> The 'this_cpu_ptr()' is used to obtain the AEAD key' TFM on the current
>>>>> CPU for encryption, however the execution can be preemptible since it's
>>>>> actually user-space context, so the 'using smp_processor_id() in
>>>>> preemptible' has been observed.
>>>>>
>>>>> We fix the issue by using the 'get/put_cpu_ptr()' API which consists of
>>>>> a 'preempt_disable()' instead.
>>>>>
>>>>> Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication")
>>>>
>>>> Have you forgotten ' Reported-by: syzbot+263f8c0d007dc09b2dda@syzkaller.appspotmail.com' ?
>>> Well, really I detected the issue during my testing instead, didn't know if it was reported by syzbot too.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>  net/tipc/crypto.c | 12 +++++++++---
>>>>>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c
>>>>> index c38babaa4e57..7c523dc81575 100644
>>>>> --- a/net/tipc/crypto.c
>>>>> +++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c
>>>>> @@ -326,7 +326,8 @@ static void tipc_aead_free(struct rcu_head *rp)
>>>>>  	if (aead->cloned) {
>>>>>  		tipc_aead_put(aead->cloned);
>>>>>  	} else {
>>>>> -		head = *this_cpu_ptr(aead->tfm_entry);
>>>>> +		head = *get_cpu_ptr(aead->tfm_entry);
>>>>> +		put_cpu_ptr(aead->tfm_entry);
>>>>
>>>> Why is this safe ?
>>>>
>>>> I think that this very unusual construct needs a comment, because this is not obvious.
>>>>
>>>> This really looks like an attempt to silence syzbot to me.
>>> No, this is not to silence syzbot but really safe.
>>> This is because the "aead->tfm_entry" object is "common" between CPUs, there is only its pointer to be the "per_cpu" one. So just
>> trying to lock the process on the current CPU or 'preempt_disable()', taking the per-cpu pointer and dereferencing to the actual
>> "tfm_entry" object... is enough. Later on, that’s fine to play with the actual object without any locking.
>>
>> Why using per cpu pointers, if they all point to a common object ?
>>
>> This makes the code really confusing.
> Sorry for making you confused. Yes, the code is a bit ugly and could be made in some other ways... The initial idea is to not touch or change the same pointer variable in different CPUs so avoid a penalty with the cache hits/misses...

What makes this code interrupt safe ?

Having a per-cpu list is not interrupt safe without special care.




  reply	other threads:[~2020-08-31 12:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-29 19:37 [net] tipc: fix using smp_processor_id() in preemptible Tuong Lien
2020-08-31  2:14 ` David Miller
2020-08-31  8:14 ` Eric Dumazet
2020-08-31  8:33   ` Tuong Tong Lien
2020-08-31  9:47     ` Eric Dumazet
2020-08-31 10:05       ` Tuong Tong Lien
2020-08-31 12:48         ` Eric Dumazet [this message]
2020-09-01 12:18           ` Tuong Tong Lien
2020-09-01 13:15             ` Eric Dumazet
2020-09-01 17:52               ` Tuong Tong Lien
2020-09-02  7:10                 ` Eric Dumazet
2020-09-15 10:54                   ` Tuong Tong Lien

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