From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Hans Reiser Subject: Re: Using fs views to isolate untrusted processes: I need an assistant architect in the USA for Phase I of a DARPA funded linux kernel project Date: Mon, 02 Aug 2004 12:55:02 -0700 Message-ID: <410E9C16.1000109@namesys.com> References: <410D96DC.1060405@namesys.com> <200408021112.08981.christian.mayrhuber@gmx.net> <87r7qpo3dj.fsf@uhoreg.ca> <200408022102.41838.christian.mayrhuber@gmx.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: list-help: list-unsubscribe: list-post: Errors-To: flx@namesys.com In-Reply-To: <200408022102.41838.christian.mayrhuber@gmx.net> List-Id: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format="flowed" To: Christian Mayrhuber Cc: reiserfs-list@namesys.com Christian Mayrhuber wrote: >On Monday 02 August 2004 19:29, Hubert Chan wrote: > > >>>>>>>"Christian" == Christian Mayrhuber >>>>>>>writes: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>Christian> Linux VServer might be a project that already tries to >>Christian> accomplish this task. >> >>After poking around the linux-veserver.org page, it sounds like Linux >>VServer is completely different from what Hans/Namesys is trying to do. >>Linux VServer still uses chroot. From what I understand about views, >>you don't need to set up a chroot; applications run under the same >>filesystem as everything else. You just need to, for example, say that >>apache is allowed to read from /etc/apache/*, /var/www, /usr/lib, etc., >>and is allowed to write to /var/log/apache/*. Then, even though apache >>is running under the same filesystem, it won't even be able to see, say >>/etc/passwd. >> >> >Yes, you are right, after reading Hans writeup on the homepage it's clear to >me. Views will be definitely very handy. Process Oriented Security seems to >be a rather complicated task to administer - it reads like tripwire >configuration. > >The vserver project has similiar goals: > - ease administration > - higher security > >chroot() + a marker is still used, because there is nothing better available >today ... >Process separation is accomplished by attaching a context number to every >process. Processes with a higher context number than 1 are jailed in their >root directory. The network interfaces, process RAM, CPU and disk quota usage >is also bound to the same number. >You can give a "view" to the world outside the chroot() jail by using >"mount --bind" in the pre-start phase of the vserver. > >The views and process oriented security concepts seem to be orthogonal to >linux vserver. > > > Perhaps we will be a tool verver will find useful.