Re: ssh policy

[Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>]

Russell Coker wrote:

>On Sat, 11 Sep 2004 01:08, Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> wrote:
>  
>
>>>-r_dir_file(updfstab_t, { selinux_config_t file_context_t
>>>default_context_t } ) can_getsecurity(updfstab_t)
>>>+dontaudit updfstab_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
>>>      
>>>
>>I don't think that this is correct; updfstab appears to be looking up a
>>context via matchpathcon for preserving the context on /etc/fstab, so it
>>needs access to the file contexts file as in our policy.
>>    
>>
>
>Why do we want to have updfstab do that?  Adding such functionality to 
>updfstab means more work for it to do, more time taken to complete, etc.
>
>Just having updfstab create the new file as /etc/fstab.new (or similar) makes 
>it get the right context automatically with much less effort.
>
>We don't want to change every program that creates a file to preserve the SE 
>Linux context!  That would take significant development work and create 
>significant issues if the SE Linux interfaces ever change.
>
>The source to fstab-sync refers to the idea of creating a new fstab file 
>in /tmp if /etc is mounted read-only (with /etc/fstab being a sym-link to 
>somewhere else).  If this is implemented as described in the comments then an 
>inopportune power failure or system crash could potentially truncate the 
>fstab file and make the system non-bootable.  I think we should give up on 
>the idea of having fstab-sync do anything special in regard to SE Linux.
>
>Dan, what do you think?
>
>  
>
That sounds good to me.  I will look into who made the change and see if 
we remedy this.

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