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From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: SELinux <SELinux@tycho.nsa.gov>, Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Proposed patch for libselinux
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 2004 14:00:18 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <417D3F32.5030902@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1098715957.13491.157.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>

Stephen Smalley wrote:

>Let's step back for a moment from the implementation details and talk
>about the concept/usage of this customized flag for SELinux attributes.
>
>The file_contexts configuration and setfiles were only intended to
>initialize the system, as previously noted.  After installation, one
>should only do a make relabel upon a major policy upgrade, and even in
>that case, it would be better to selectively relabel based on the
>differences between the policies.  At runtime, the file attributes will
>be set based on policy and in some cases refined by application and/or
>user knowledge subject to policy (setfscreatecon(3) or setfilecon(3)),
>reflecting the actual security properties of the objects.
>
>At any given time, you can find all files that are no longer consistent
>with the file_contexts configuration via setfiles -nv.  You don't need a
>separate file attribute for that purpose, and the proposed flags
>attribute will only show files relabeled via chcon(1).  Why should we
>treat such files differently than a file whose security context was set
>by any other application using setfilecon(3) or created after an
>explicit setfscreatecon(3) or even created in accordance with a file
>type transition rule?  Typically, we don't want any of those files to be
>relabeled by a subsequent make relabel; we would only want them
>relabeled if there was a policy bug or application bug that had allowed
>those files to become mis-labeled in the first place at runtime, or if
>there has been a change in policy that affects those files/types.
>
>I'm inclined more towards the idea of alternatives in the file_contexts
>configuration, e.g. you specify a "primary" security context to be
>applied upon initialization, and you optionally specify alternatives
>(either individually or via equivalence classes) that are equally
>permissible.  setfiles then defaults to applying the primary context,
>but will allow the file to remain unchanged if it has been set to any of
>the alternatives.
>
>  
>
This is true.  But we still need an easy way for users to add additional 
security contexts to the environment.
without installing policy-*sources
IE I setup an alternate build environment under /opt/working that I want 
owned by dwalsh. 
To do that presently you would need to install sources and add a file 
under file_context/misc

We need to change setfiles or some tool to look in 
/etc/selinux/*/context/files/* and load all policy files in the directory.
Starting with file_context.


Dan

Dan

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2004-10-25 18:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-10-21 21:35 Proposed patch for libselinux Daniel J Walsh
2004-10-22 12:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-10-22 13:22   ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-10-22 13:44     ` Stephen Smalley
2004-10-22 14:22       ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-10-22 15:56   ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-10-22 19:55     ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-10-22 20:22     ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-10-25 14:52       ` Stephen Smalley
2004-10-25 15:31         ` Colin Walters
2004-10-25 18:00         ` Daniel J Walsh [this message]
2004-10-26 14:21         ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-10-26 14:13           ` Stephen Smalley
2004-10-26 15:21             ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-10-26 18:05           ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-10-29 23:28   ` Proposed patch for libselinux -- xdr ??? Nifty Hat Mitch
2004-10-22 13:23 ` Proposed patch for libselinux Stephen Smalley
2004-10-22 13:45   ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-10-22 14:15     ` Stephen Smalley
2004-10-22 14:24       ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-10-22 14:30         ` Stephen Smalley
2004-10-22 18:01           ` Daniel J Walsh

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