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From: Bryan Shake <bshake@vt.edu>
To: netfilter@lists.netfilter.org
Subject: Re: OS Fingerprint
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2004 23:02:02 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <41ABF0BA.7000105@vt.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7C9884991ADAE0479C14F10C858BCDF56795F1@alderaan.smgtec.com>

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On 11/29/04 17:12, Daniel Chemko wrote:
> Vlado Had wrote:
> 
>>hi, could somebody help me, how can i change
>>osfingerprint in packets?
>>thanks
> 
> 
> Do some homework. Basically a scanner uses inherent flaws in a packet
> response to determine the destination machine, but it could also use the
> fingerprint of the services running on the PC. Ex. if I implement 100%
> faking on the networking part of my stealthing, but leave apache open,
> the apache could say Redhat Linux blahblahblah and give it all away to
> the hacker. It isn't just 'change TOS to random', or MSS to y, or block
> all n packets to port q. Those are some OS fingerprint examples, but the
> technique is a lot more detailed. If in doubt, tear open the nmap code!
>

The IP Personality patch may be a solution, although it could only do so 
much as pointed out above (running network processes giving you away, 
etc) ... "http://ippersonality.sourceforge.net/"

Unfortunately, it doesn't appear to be actively maintained any longer.. 
  Linux 2.4.18 and iptables 1.2.2 were the last official releases, with 
a 2.4.20 patch here that doesn't seem to have ever made it onto the 
official download page.
"http://sourceforge.net/tracker/index.php?func=detail&aid=647045&group_id=7557&atid=307557" 


Additionaly, some OS fingerprinting tools such as p0f can be tricked by 
carefully modifying sysctl values such as ip_default_ttl, etc as they 
rely on matching a certain profile.

Bryan

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  reply	other threads:[~2004-11-30  4:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-11-29 22:12 OS Fingerprint Daniel Chemko
2004-11-30  4:02 ` Bryan Shake [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2004-11-30 14:15 谷子
2004-11-29 22:27 Hudson Delbert J Contr 61 CS/SCBN
2004-11-29 21:57 Vlado Had
2004-11-30 14:21 ` Aleksandar Milivojevic
2003-11-18 11:14 hclfm
2003-11-18 10:05 Rodre Ghorashi-Zadeh
2003-11-18 10:57 ` Antony Stone
2003-11-18 14:29 ` Chris Brenton
2003-11-18 15:57   ` Maciej Soltysiak

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