All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: stranche@codeaurora.org
To: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: pablo@netfilter.org, netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org,
	lucien.xin@gmail.com, subashab@codeaurora.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH nf] Revert "netfilter: unlock xt_table earlier in __do_replace"
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:08:14 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <41d1a7e128c92ac4cbc85806e0a09692@codeaurora.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200123102921.GU795@breakpoint.cc>

On 2020-01-23 03:29, Florian Westphal wrote:
> 
> I don't see how this changes anything wrt. packet path.
> This disallows another instance of iptables(-restore) to come in
> before the counters have been copied/freed and the destructors have 
> run.
> 
> But as those have nothing to do with the jumpstack I don't see how this
> helps.

Based on on the stack of the iptables-restore task that freed the 
jumpstack being accessed in the ipt_do_table() routine, we end up in 
__do_replace()
       0xFFFFFF9239243AE0, ->kvfree
       0xFFFFFF923A1969EC, ->xt_free_table_info+0x50
       0xFFFFFF923A2100E0, ->__do_replace+0x200

Prior to the original patch, this xt_free_table_info was under lock, so 
it seems that having this call under lock guarantees that the new 
table->private entry that contains the jumpstack is seen across all 
CPUs.

> 
> But the packet path doesn't grab the table mutex.
> 

Good point. Perhaps the reason that moving this lock helps is because it 
prevents multiple writers from stepping on one another in such a way 
that the private entry is left in a bad state. Or this whole thing is a 
red herring and the problem is actually that xt_replace_table() is able 
to return prematurely and not all CPUs are finished with the old 
jumpstack by the time the old table info is freed.

  reply	other threads:[~2020-01-23 20:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-23  0:47 [PATCH nf] Revert "netfilter: unlock xt_table earlier in __do_replace" Sean Tranchetti
2020-01-23 10:29 ` Florian Westphal
2020-01-23 20:08   ` stranche [this message]
2020-02-03 10:51   ` Xin Long

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=41d1a7e128c92ac4cbc85806e0a09692@codeaurora.org \
    --to=stranche@codeaurora.org \
    --cc=fw@strlen.de \
    --cc=lucien.xin@gmail.com \
    --cc=netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pablo@netfilter.org \
    --cc=subashab@codeaurora.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.