From: pageexec@freemail.hu
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Arjan van de Ven <arjanv@redhat.com>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Sabotaged PaXtest (was: Re: Patch 4/6 randomize the stack pointer)
Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2005 22:27:19 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <42093CC7.5086.1FC83D3E@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050207223609.GA12609@elte.hu>
> btw., do you consider PaX as a 100% sure solution against 'code
> injection' attacks (meaning that the attacker wants to execute an
> arbitrary piece of code, and assuming the attacked application has a
> stack overflow)? I.e. does PaX avoid all such attacks in a guaranteed
> way?
your question is answered in http://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/pax.txt
that i suggested you to read over a year ago. the short answer is
that it's not only about stack overflows but any kind of memory
corruption bugs, and you need both a properly configured kernel
(for PaX/i386 that would be SEGMEXEC/MPROTECT/NOELFRELOCS) and an
access control system (to take care of the file system and file
mappings) and a properly prepared userland (e.g., no text relocations
in ELF executables/libs, which is a good thing anyway).
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-02-08 12:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-02-02 16:51 Sabotaged PaXtest (was: Re: Patch 4/6 randomize the stack pointer) Ingo Molnar
2005-02-02 22:08 ` pageexec
2005-02-03 9:44 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-02-03 14:20 ` pageexec
2005-02-03 20:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-02-07 14:23 ` pageexec
2005-02-07 21:08 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-02-08 12:27 ` pageexec
2005-02-08 21:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-02-07 22:36 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-02-08 12:27 ` pageexec [this message]
2005-02-08 13:41 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-02-08 14:25 ` Julien TINNES
2005-02-08 16:56 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-02-08 16:48 ` the "Turing Attack" (was: Sabotaged PaXtest) Ingo Molnar
2005-02-08 22:08 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-02-10 13:43 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-02-10 13:58 ` Jakob Oestergaard
2005-02-10 15:21 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-02-10 20:03 ` David Weinehall
2005-02-11 8:51 ` Mika Bostrom
2005-02-08 22:41 ` H. Peter Anvin
2005-02-03 13:55 ` Sabotaged PaXtest (was: Re: Patch 4/6 randomize the stack pointer) Peter Busser
2005-02-03 14:39 ` Roman Zippel
2005-02-07 12:23 ` pageexec
2005-02-07 18:31 ` John Richard Moser
[not found] <200501311015.20964.arjan@infradead.org>
2005-01-31 12:57 ` Peter Busser
2005-01-31 16:41 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-02-01 9:44 ` Peter Busser
2005-02-01 11:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-02-01 14:48 ` Peter Busser
2005-02-01 21:39 ` Diego Calleja
2005-02-02 0:15 ` Theodore Ts'o
2005-02-02 8:26 ` Theodore Ts'o
2005-02-02 9:55 ` Peter Busser
2005-02-02 9:35 ` Peter Busser
2005-02-02 9:52 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-02-02 12:18 ` pageexec
2005-02-02 13:13 ` Peter Busser
2005-02-02 14:12 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-02-02 18:02 ` Olivier Galibert
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