From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
kwc@citi.umich.edu, arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in, dwalsh@redhat.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: Don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2008 02:30:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4243.1205461820@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080313152059.90681241.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> hm, I didn't realise that the keys code had special knowlege of "root".
> How does that play alongside the containers stuff?
The containers stuff lacks a keys container. I'll have to attend to that at
some point.
The key code didn't so much have special knowledge of root, as UID 0 is
compiled into the kernel in various ways.
> would be more conventional.
>
> But better would be to teach alloc_uid() about kmem_cache_zalloc() then
> take a chainsaw to it.
Yeah, I was thinking that. That'd allow a slew of initialisations-to-zero to
be removed from that function, as indeed you have done in your attached patch.
> From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
>
> Use kmem_cache_zalloc(), remove large amounts of initialsiation code and
> ifdeffery.
"initialisation" perchance? :-)
> Note: this assumes that memset(*atomic_t, 0) correctly initialises the
> atomic_t. This is true for all present archtiectures and if it becomes false
> for a future architecture then we'll need to make large changes all over the
> place anyway.
>
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-03-14 2:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-03-13 19:14 [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: Allow clients to set key perms in key_create_or_update() David Howells
2008-03-13 19:14 ` [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: Don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed David Howells
2008-03-13 22:20 ` Andrew Morton
2008-03-14 2:30 ` David Howells [this message]
2008-03-13 19:14 ` [PATCH 3/3] KEYS: Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys David Howells
2008-03-13 22:28 ` Andrew Morton
2008-03-14 2:39 ` David Howells
2008-03-14 11:46 ` David Howells
2008-03-13 22:47 ` Andrew Morton
2008-03-14 2:30 ` David Howells
2008-03-19 0:04 ` Andrew Morton
2008-03-19 11:19 ` David Howells
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=4243.1205461820@redhat.com \
--to=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in \
--cc=dwalsh@redhat.com \
--cc=kwc@citi.umich.edu \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.