Re: [Fwd: Latest Diff]

[Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>]

Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:

>>>diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/restorecon.te policy-1.23.14/domains/program/restorecon.te
>>>--- nsapolicy/domains/program/restorecon.te	2005-04-27 10:28:49.000000000 -0400
>>>+++ policy-1.23.14/domains/program/restorecon.te	2005-05-05 15:11:06.000000000 -0400
>>>@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
>>> role secadm_r types restorecon_t;
>>> 
>>> allow restorecon_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file { read write ioctl };
>>>-allow restorecon_t { tty_device_t admin_tty_type }:chr_file { read write ioctl };
>>>+allow restorecon_t { tty_device_t admin_tty_type devtty_t }:chr_file { read write ioctl };
>>>      
>>>
>
>Perhaps (?):
>
>allow restorecon_t tty_device_t:chr_file { read write ioctl};
>access_terminal(restorecon_t, $2)
>access_terminal(restorecon_t, initrc)
>
>  
>
>>>diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/auditd.te policy-1.23.14/domains/program/unused/auditd.te
>>>--- nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/auditd.te	2005-05-02 14:06:54.000000000 -0400
>>>+++ policy-1.23.14/domains/program/unused/auditd.te	2005-05-02 14:57:26.000000000 -0400
>>>@@ -56,3 +56,4 @@
>>> allow auditctl_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read;
>>> allow auditd_t self:process setsched;
>>> dontaudit auditctl_t init_t:fd use; 
>>>+allow auditctl_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
>>>      
>>>
>
>Perhaps (?):
>
>access_terminal(auditctl_t, initrc) 
>
>  
>
>>> allow consoletype_t crond_t:fifo_file { read getattr ioctl };
>>>diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/cups.te policy-1.23.14/domains/program/unused/cups.te
>>>--- nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/cups.te	2005-05-02 14:06:54.000000000 -0400
>>>+++ policy-1.23.14/domains/program/unused/cups.te	2005-05-02 14:57:26.000000000 -0400
>>>@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>>> logdir_domain(cupsd)
>>> 
>>> tmp_domain(cupsd)
>>>+file_type_auto_trans(cupsd_t, tmp_t, cupsd_tmp_t, fifo_file)
>>>      
>>>
>
>tmp_domain(cupsd, `', { file dir fifo_file })
>
>  
>
ok

>>>@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
>>> allow hald_t printer_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
>>> allow hald_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
>>> allow hald_t mouse_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
>>>+allow hald_t memory_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
>>>      
>>>
>
>?? That no longer triggers an assertion violation?
>  
>
privmem attribute allows this.

>I specifically had to allow it in the assertion list when
>it was necessary for dmidecode. Why is it still necessary?
>
>  
>
>>>diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/macros/program/games_domain.te policy-1.23.14/macros/program/games_domain.te
>>>--- nsapolicy/macros/program/games_domain.te	2005-04-27 10:28:54.000000000 -0400
>>>+++ policy-1.23.14/macros/program/games_domain.te	2005-05-05 15:10:05.000000000 -0400
>>>@@ -17,11 +17,14 @@
>>> if (! disable_games_trans) {
>>> domain_auto_trans($1_t, games_exec_t, $1_games_t)
>>> }
>>>+can_exec($1_games_t, games_exec_t)
>>>      
>>>
>
>It needs to re-execute itself??
>
>===============
>
>Question: 
>
>Is it better to create orbit-$USER in a startup script, or
>to include selinux support in libORBit2 in order to 
>properly set the context of /tmp/orbit-$USER to ROLE_orbit_tmp_t 
>when it's created?
>
>  
>


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