From: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
To: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com>
Subject: [PATCH] libxc hardening
Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2005 23:15:33 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <42BA3765.8030809@us.ibm.com> (raw)
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Howdy,
The following patches hardens a good portion of libxc's error path code
against errno clobbering. Errno clobbering occurs when a function
returns a failure code (such as -1) but then calls some other function
(like munmap or perror) that could potentially change the value of errno.
The patch doesn't touch any of the build/save/restore code because it
seems like since these functions do so much work it would be useful to
create special error returns for them. Does this sound reasonable?
There's also a ton of read() calls that need to be hardened but that's
another patch.
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori
Regards,
Anthony Liguori
[-- Attachment #2: xc_errno_hardening.diff --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 8180 bytes --]
diff -ur xen-unstable-1/tools/libxc/xc_evtchn.c xen-unstable/tools/libxc/xc_evtchn.c
--- xen-unstable-1/tools/libxc/xc_evtchn.c 2005-06-22 17:50:44.000000000 -0500
+++ xen-unstable/tools/libxc/xc_evtchn.c 2005-06-22 22:59:39.297821600 -0500
@@ -13,21 +13,29 @@
{
int ret = -1;
privcmd_hypercall_t hypercall;
+ int saved_errno = 0;
hypercall.op = __HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op;
hypercall.arg[0] = (unsigned long)op;
if ( mlock(op, sizeof(*op)) != 0 )
{
+ saved_errno = errno;
PERROR("do_evtchn_op: op mlock failed");
goto out;
}
- if ((ret = do_xen_hypercall(xc_handle, &hypercall)) < 0)
+ if ((ret = do_xen_hypercall(xc_handle, &hypercall)) < 0) {
+ saved_errno = errno;
ERROR("do_evtchn_op: HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op failed: %d", ret);
+ }
(void)munlock(op, sizeof(*op));
out:
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ }
return ret;
}
diff -ur xen-unstable-1/tools/libxc/xc_gnttab.c xen-unstable/tools/libxc/xc_gnttab.c
--- xen-unstable-1/tools/libxc/xc_gnttab.c 2005-06-22 17:50:44.000000000 -0500
+++ xen-unstable/tools/libxc/xc_gnttab.c 2005-06-22 23:03:13.451265328 -0500
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
{
int ret = -1;
privcmd_hypercall_t hypercall;
+ int saved_errno = 0;
hypercall.op = __HYPERVISOR_grant_table_op;
hypercall.arg[0] = cmd;
@@ -26,15 +27,21 @@
if ( mlock(op, sizeof(*op)) != 0 )
{
+ saved_errno = errno;
PERROR("do_gnttab_op: op mlock failed");
goto out;
}
- if ( (ret = do_xen_hypercall(xc_handle, &hypercall)) < 0 )
+ if ( (ret = do_xen_hypercall(xc_handle, &hypercall)) < 0 ) {
+ saved_errno = errno;
ERROR("do_gnttab_op: HYPERVISOR_grant_table_op failed: %d", ret);
+ }
(void)munlock(op, sizeof(*op));
out:
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -129,8 +136,11 @@
int xc_grant_interface_open(void)
{
int fd = open("/proc/xen/grant", O_RDWR);
- if ( fd == -1 )
+ if ( fd == -1 ) {
+ int saved_errno = errno;
PERROR("Could not obtain handle on grant command interface");
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ }
return fd;
}
diff -ur xen-unstable-1/tools/libxc/xc_misc.c xen-unstable/tools/libxc/xc_misc.c
--- xen-unstable-1/tools/libxc/xc_misc.c 2005-06-22 17:50:44.000000000 -0500
+++ xen-unstable/tools/libxc/xc_misc.c 2005-06-22 23:05:47.644824344 -0500
@@ -9,8 +9,11 @@
int xc_interface_open(void)
{
int fd = open("/proc/xen/privcmd", O_RDWR);
- if ( fd == -1 )
+ if ( fd == -1 ) {
+ int saved_errno = errno;
PERROR("Could not obtain handle on privileged command interface");
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ }
return fd;
}
@@ -28,6 +31,7 @@
dom0_op_t op;
char *buffer = *pbuffer;
unsigned int nr_chars = *pnr_chars;
+ int saved_errno = 0;
op.cmd = DOM0_READCONSOLE;
op.u.readconsole.buffer = buffer;
@@ -41,10 +45,14 @@
{
*pbuffer = op.u.readconsole.buffer;
*pnr_chars = op.u.readconsole.count;
+ saved_errno = errno;
}
(void)munlock(buffer, nr_chars);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ }
return ret;
}
diff -ur xen-unstable-1/tools/libxc/xc_private.c xen-unstable/tools/libxc/xc_private.c
--- xen-unstable-1/tools/libxc/xc_private.c 2005-06-22 17:50:44.000000000 -0500
+++ xen-unstable/tools/libxc/xc_private.c 2005-06-22 23:07:56.069300856 -0500
@@ -16,14 +16,25 @@
if ( addr == MAP_FAILED )
return NULL;
+ /* even though NULL is a valid return for mmap(), it's not likely on the
+ platforms we support. we use null as an invalid return those so just
+ make sure we don't ever get ourselves confused. */
+ if ( addr == NULL ) {
+ munmap(addr, num*PAGE_SIZE);
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
ioctlx.num=num;
ioctlx.dom=dom;
ioctlx.addr=(unsigned long)addr;
ioctlx.arr=arr;
if ( ioctl( xc_handle, IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAPBATCH, &ioctlx ) < 0 )
{
- perror("XXXXXXXX");
+ int saved_errno = errno;
+ PERROR("mmap_batch ioctl failed!");
munmap(addr, num*PAGE_SIZE);
+ errno = saved_errno;
return NULL;
}
return addr;
@@ -43,6 +54,12 @@
if ( addr == MAP_FAILED )
return NULL;
+ if ( addr == NULL ) {
+ munmap(addr, size);
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
ioctlx.num=1;
ioctlx.dom=dom;
ioctlx.entry=&entry;
@@ -51,7 +68,9 @@
entry.npages=(size+PAGE_SIZE-1)>>PAGE_SHIFT;
if ( ioctl( xc_handle, IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP, &ioctlx ) < 0 )
{
+ int saved_errno = errno;
munmap(addr, size);
+ errno = saved_errno;
return NULL;
}
return addr;
@@ -82,7 +101,9 @@
op.u.getpageframeinfo.domain = (domid_t)dom;
if ( do_dom0_op(xc_handle, &op) < 0 )
{
+ int saved_errno = errno;
PERROR("Unexpected failure when getting page frame info!");
+ errno = saved_errno;
return GETPFN_ERR;
}
return op.u.getpageframeinfo.type;
@@ -110,6 +131,7 @@
{
int err = 0;
privcmd_hypercall_t hypercall;
+ int saved_errno = 0;
if ( mmu->idx == 0 )
return 0;
@@ -122,6 +144,7 @@
if ( mlock(mmu->updates, sizeof(mmu->updates)) != 0 )
{
+ saved_errno = errno;
PERROR("flush_mmu_updates: mmu updates mlock failed");
err = 1;
goto out;
@@ -129,6 +152,7 @@
if ( do_xen_hypercall(xc_handle, &hypercall) < 0 )
{
+ saved_errno = errno;
ERROR("Failure when submitting mmu updates");
err = 1;
}
@@ -138,6 +162,10 @@
(void)munlock(mmu->updates, sizeof(mmu->updates));
out:
+ if (err != 0) {
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ }
+
return err;
}
@@ -179,7 +207,9 @@
op.u.getvcpucontext.ctxt = NULL;
if ( (do_dom0_op(xc_handle, &op) < 0) )
{
+ int saved_errno = errno;
PERROR("Could not get info on domain");
+ errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
return op.u.getvcpucontext.cpu_time;
@@ -205,7 +235,9 @@
if ( ioctl( xc_handle, IOCTL_PRIVCMD_GET_MACH2PHYS_START_MFN, &mfn ) < 0 )
{
- perror("xc_get_m2p_start_mfn:");
+ int saved_errno = errno;
+ PERROR("xc_get_m2p_start_mfn:");
+ errno = saved_errno;
return 0;
}
return mfn;
@@ -218,6 +250,8 @@
{
dom0_op_t op;
int ret;
+ int saved_errno;
+
op.cmd = DOM0_GETMEMLIST;
op.u.getmemlist.domain = (domid_t)domid;
op.u.getmemlist.max_pfns = max_pfns;
@@ -231,6 +265,7 @@
}
ret = do_dom0_op(xc_handle, &op);
+ saved_errno = errno;
(void)munlock(pfn_buf, max_pfns * sizeof(unsigned long));
@@ -249,6 +284,8 @@
#endif
#endif
+ if (ret < 0) errno = saved_errno;
+
return (ret < 0) ? -1 : op.u.getmemlist.num_pfns;
}
@@ -303,33 +340,39 @@
gzFile kernel_gfd = NULL;
char *image = NULL;
unsigned int bytes;
+ int saved_errno = 0;
if ( (kernel_fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0 )
{
+ saved_errno = errno;
PERROR("Could not open kernel image");
goto out;
}
if ( (*size = xc_get_filesz(kernel_fd)) == 0 )
{
+ saved_errno = errno;
PERROR("Could not read kernel image");
goto out;
}
if ( (kernel_gfd = gzdopen(kernel_fd, "rb")) == NULL )
{
+ saved_errno = errno;
PERROR("Could not allocate decompression state for state file");
goto out;
}
if ( (image = malloc(*size)) == NULL )
{
+ saved_errno = errno;
PERROR("Could not allocate memory for kernel image");
goto out;
}
if ( (bytes = gzread(kernel_gfd, image, *size)) != *size )
{
+ saved_errno = errno;
PERROR("Error reading kernel image, could not"
" read the whole image (%d != %ld).", bytes, *size);
free(image);
@@ -341,6 +384,10 @@
gzclose(kernel_gfd);
else if ( kernel_fd >= 0 )
close(kernel_fd);
+ if (image == NULL) {
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ }
+
return image;
}
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next reply other threads:[~2005-06-23 4:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-06-23 4:15 Anthony Liguori [this message]
2005-06-23 8:43 ` [PATCH] libxc hardening Keir Fraser
2005-06-23 18:24 ` Chris Wright
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