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From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
To: russell@coker.com.au
Cc: SE-Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: misc policy patches
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2005 15:57:40 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <432F1834.8080809@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200509192101.04722.russell@coker.com.au>

Russell Coker wrote:

>The attached patch has a bunch of small changes that are fairly obvious (and 
>the less obvious ones have comments).
>  
>
What is this for?
+allow mount_t named_conf_t:dir mounton;


>  
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>diff -ru /tmp/t/domains/program/fsadm.te ./domains/program/fsadm.te
>--- /tmp/t/domains/program/fsadm.te	2005-09-19 14:54:58.000000000 +1000
>+++ ./domains/program/fsadm.te	2005-08-29 14:44:56.000000000 +1000
>@@ -118,3 +118,6 @@
> allow fsadm_t usbfs_t:dir { getattr search };
> allow fsadm_t ramfs_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
> allow fsadm_t device_type:chr_file getattr;
>+
>+# for tune2fs
>+allow fsadm_t file_type:dir { getattr search };
>diff -ru /tmp/t/domains/program/load_policy.te ./domains/program/load_policy.te
>--- /tmp/t/domains/program/load_policy.te	2005-09-19 14:54:58.000000000 +1000
>+++ ./domains/program/load_policy.te	2005-09-18 09:17:32.000000000 +1000
>@@ -45,6 +49,9 @@
> allow load_policy_t root_t:dir search;
> allow load_policy_t etc_t:dir search;
> 
>+# for mcs.conf
>+allow load_policy_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
>+
> # Other access
> can_access_pty(load_policy_t, initrc)
> allow load_policy_t { admin_tty_type devtty_t }:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
>diff -ru /tmp/t/domains/program/mount.te ./domains/program/mount.te
>--- /tmp/t/domains/program/mount.te	2005-09-19 14:54:58.000000000 +1000
>+++ ./domains/program/mount.te	2005-09-18 09:03:58.000000000 +1000
>@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
> allow mount_t init_t:fd use;
> allow mount_t privfd:fd use;
> 
>-allow mount_t self:capability { ipc_lock dac_override };
>+allow mount_t self:capability { dac_override ipc_lock sys_tty_config };
> allow mount_t self:process { fork signal_perms };
> 
> allow mount_t file_type:dir search;
>diff -ru /tmp/t/domains/program/named.te ./domains/program/named.te
>--- /tmp/t/domains/program/named.te	2005-09-19 14:54:58.000000000 +1000
>+++ ./domains/program/named.te	2005-08-08 13:54:06.000000000 +1000
>@@ -113,13 +113,19 @@
> read_locale(ndc_t)
> can_tcp_connect(ndc_t, named_t)
> 
>-# for /etc/rndc.key
> ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
>+# for /etc/rndc.key
> allow { ndc_t initrc_t } named_conf_t:dir search;
> # Allow init script to cp localtime to named_conf_t
> allow initrc_t named_conf_t:file { setattr write };
> allow initrc_t named_conf_t:dir create_dir_perms;
>-')
>+allow initrc_t var_run_t:lnk_file create_file_perms;
>+ifdef(`automount.te', `
>+# automount has no need to search the /proc file system for the named chroot
>+dontaudit automount_t named_zone_t:dir search;
>+')dnl end ifdef automount.te
>+')dnl end ifdef distro_redhat
>+
> allow { ndc_t initrc_t } named_conf_t:file { getattr read };
> 
> allow ndc_t etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
>@@ -161,3 +167,5 @@
> ')
> allow ndc_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
> dontaudit ndc_t sysadm_tty_device_t:chr_file { ioctl };
>+
>+allow mount_t named_conf_t:dir mounton;
>diff -ru /tmp/t/domains/program/ntpd.te ./domains/program/ntpd.te
>--- /tmp/t/domains/program/ntpd.te	2005-09-19 14:54:58.000000000 +1000
>+++ ./domains/program/ntpd.te	2005-09-18 09:05:14.000000000 +1000
>@@ -26,9 +26,10 @@
> # for SSP
> allow ntpd_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
> 
>-allow ntpd_t self:capability { chown dac_override kill setgid setuid sys_time net_bind_service ipc_lock sys_chroot };
>+# sys_resource and setrlimit is for locking memory
>+allow ntpd_t self:capability { chown dac_override kill setgid setuid sys_time net_bind_service ipc_lock sys_chroot sys_resource };
> dontaudit ntpd_t self:capability { net_admin };
>-allow ntpd_t self:process { setcap setsched };
>+allow ntpd_t self:process { setcap setsched setrlimit };
> # ntpdate wants sys_nice
> dontaudit ntpd_t self:capability { fsetid sys_nice };
> 
>diff -ru /tmp/t/domains/program/rlogind.te ./domains/program/rlogind.te
>--- /tmp/t/domains/program/rlogind.te	2005-09-19 14:54:58.000000000 +1000
>+++ ./domains/program/rlogind.te	2005-07-19 16:50:09.000000000 +1000
>@@ -35,4 +35,6 @@
> allow rlogind_t default_t:dir search;
> typealias rlogind_port_t alias rlogin_port_t;
> read_sysctl(rlogind_t);
>-allow rlogind_t krb5_keytab_t:file r_file_perms;
>+ifdef(`kerberos.te', `
>+allow rlogind_t krb5_keytab_t:file { getattr read };
>+')
>diff -ru /tmp/t/domains/program/useradd.te ./domains/program/useradd.te
>--- /tmp/t/domains/program/useradd.te	2005-09-19 14:54:58.000000000 +1000
>+++ ./domains/program/useradd.te	2005-09-18 20:51:38.000000000 +1000
>@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@
> # useradd/userdel request read/write for /var/log/lastlog, and read of /dev, 
> # but will operate without them.
> dontaudit $1_t { device_t var_t var_log_t }:dir search;
>-allow useradd_t lastlog_t:file { read write };
> 
> # For userdel and groupadd
> allow $1_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
>@@ -68,8 +67,11 @@
> # for when /root is the cwd
> dontaudit $1_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir search;
> nsswitch_domain($1_t)
>+
>+allow $1_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms nlmsg_relay };
> ')
> user_group_add_program(useradd)
>+allow useradd_t lastlog_t:file { getattr read write };
> 
> # for getting the number of groups
> read_sysctl(useradd_t)
>diff -ru /tmp/t/domains/program/utempter.te ./domains/program/utempter.te
>--- /tmp/t/domains/program/utempter.te	2005-09-19 14:54:58.000000000 +1000
>+++ ./domains/program/utempter.te	2005-07-20 17:25:24.000000000 +1000
>@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
> type utempter_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
> domain_auto_trans(userdomain, utempter_exec_t, utempter_t)
> 
>+allow utempter_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
>+
> # Use capabilities.
> allow utempter_t self:capability setgid;
> 
>diff -ru /tmp/t/file_contexts/program/backup.fc ./file_contexts/program/backup.fc
>--- /tmp/t/file_contexts/program/backup.fc	2005-09-19 14:54:58.000000000 +1000
>+++ ./file_contexts/program/backup.fc	2005-09-18 08:05:57.000000000 +1000
>@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@
> # calls tar) in backup_exec_t and label the directory for storing them as
> # backup_store_t, Debian uses /var/backups
> #/usr/local/bin/backup-script -- system_u:object_r:backup_exec_t
>-/var/backups(/.*)?		system_u:object_r:backup_store_t
>+/var/backups(/.*)?		system_u:object_r:backup_store_t:s0
>diff -ru /tmp/t/macros/program/newrole_macros.te ./macros/program/newrole_macros.te
>--- /tmp/t/macros/program/newrole_macros.te	2005-09-19 14:54:58.000000000 +1000
>+++ ./macros/program/newrole_macros.te	2005-04-16 14:35:04.000000000 +1000
>@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
> read_locale($1_t)
> read_sysctl($1_t)
> 
>+allow $1_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create bind write nlmsg_read read };
>+
> # for when the user types "exec newrole" at the command line
> allow $1_t privfd:process sigchld;
> 
>  
>


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  reply	other threads:[~2005-09-19 19:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-09-19 11:00 misc policy patches Russell Coker
2005-09-19 19:57 ` Daniel J Walsh [this message]
2005-09-19 20:29   ` Russell Coker
2005-09-19 23:51     ` Daniel J Walsh

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