From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from jazzdrum.ncsc.mil (zombie.ncsc.mil [144.51.88.131]) by tycho.ncsc.mil (8.12.8/8.12.8) with ESMTP id j8KJvtNs002350 for ; Tue, 20 Sep 2005 15:57:55 -0400 (EDT) Received: from mx1.redhat.com (jazzdrum.ncsc.mil [144.51.5.7]) by jazzdrum.ncsc.mil (8.12.10/8.12.10) with ESMTP id j8KJrn1Y001404 for ; Tue, 20 Sep 2005 19:53:50 GMT Message-ID: <4330696E.6070400@redhat.com> Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2005 15:56:30 -0400 From: Daniel J Walsh MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Christopher J. PeBenito" CC: SELinux Mail List Subject: Re: Reference policy status page update References: <1126650640.18007.41.camel@sgc> In-Reply-To: <1126650640.18007.41.camel@sgc> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Christopher J. PeBenito wrote: >I have updated the reference policy status page with a listing of the >remaining modules that need to be converted, and note which modules are >in the Fedora strict and targeted policies. > >http://serefpolicy.sourceforge.net/index.php?page=status > >For those looking to contribute, we ask that priority be given to the >modules in the targeted policy, and then strict policy. I've attached >my notes on converting the old macros. The big caveat is that not all >macros are expanded completely, for example the network macros, since >some are very complex because of the different expansions because of >different/optional parameters. There is also no guarantee that there >are no errors, since its just my notes. So to get from an old macro to >the end reference policy rules/interfaces, it may take a couple >expansions (especially in the network macros). > >If you're looking to contribute, please let us know what you're working >on, so we can update the status page, and then work won't be duplicated. > > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > ># ># This is the guide for converting old macros to local policy ># and new interfaces. ># ># $1, $2, etc. are replaced with and the first and second, etc. ># parameters to the old macro. ># > >######################################## ># ># Attributes ># ># $1 is the type this attribute is on > ># ># auth: complete ># >auth_read_shadow($1) > ># ># auth_chkpwd: complete ># >auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1) > ># ># file_type: complete ># >files_type($1) > ># ># fs_domain: complete ># ># handled by appropriate interfaces > ># ># mta_delivery_agent: ># >mta_mailserver_delivery($1) ># for piping mail to a command >kernel_read_system_state($1) >corecmd_exec_shell($1) >files_read_etc_runtime_files($1) >mta_append_spool($1) >ifdef(`TODO',` >optional_policy(`arpwatch.te',` > # why is mail delivered to a directory of type arpwatch_data_t? > allow mta_delivery_agent arpwatch_data_t:dir search; >') >') dnl end TODO > ># ># mta_user_agent: ># >mta_mailserver_user_agent($1) >domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1) >userdom_sigchld_all_users($1) >userdom_use_all_user_fd($1) >userdom_use_sysadm_terms($1) >allow mta_user_agent privmail:fd use; >allow mta_user_agent privmail:process sigchld; >allow mta_user_agent privmail:fifo_file { read write }; >allow mta_user_agent sysadm_t:fifo_file { read write }; >optional_policy(`arpwatch.te',` > # why is mail delivered to a directory of type arpwatch_data_t? > allow mta_user_agent arpwatch_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms; > ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` > dontaudit mta_user_agent arpwatch_t:packet_socket { read write }; > ') >') >optional_policy(`cron.te',` > cron_sigchld($1) > cron_read_system_job_tmp_files($1) >') >optional_policy(`logrotate.te',` > logrotate_read_tmp_files($1) >') > ># ># nscd_client_domain: complete ># >optional_policy(`nscd.te',` > nscd_use_socket($1) >') > ># ># privfd: complete ># >domain_wide_inherit_fd($1) > ># ># privlog: complete ># >logging_send_syslog_msg($1) > ># ># privmail: complete ># >mta_send_mail($1) > ># ># privmodule: complete ># >modutils_domtrans_insmod($1) > ># ># privowner: complete ># >domain_obj_id_change_exempt($1) > ># ># privrole: complete ># >domain_role_change_exempt($1) > ># ># privuser: complete ># >domain_subj_id_change_exempt($1) > ># ># sysadmfile: complete ># >files_type($1) > ># ># userspace_objmgr: complete ># >allow $1 self:process getattr; ># Receive notifications of policy reloads and enforcing status changes. >allow $1 self:netlink_selinux_socket { create bind read }; >selinux_get_fs_mount($1) >selinux_validate_context($1) >selinux_compute_access_vector($1) >selinux_compute_create_context($1) >selinux_compute_relabel_context($1) >selinux_compute_user_contexts($1) >seutil_read_config($1) >seutil_read_default_contexts($1) > ># ># web_client_domain: ># >optional_policy(`squid.te',` > squid_use($1) >') > >######################################## ># ># Access macros ># > ># ># access_terminal(): ># >allow $1 $2_tty_device_t:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl }; >allow $1 devtty_t:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl }; >allow $1 devpts_t:dir { read search getattr }; >allow $1 $2_devpts_t:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl }; > ># ># append_log_domain(): ># >type $1_log_t; >logging_log_file($1_log_t) >allow $1_t var_log_t:dir ra_dir_perms; >allow $1_t $1_log_t:file { create ra_file_perms }; >type_transition $1_t var_log_t:file $1_log_t; > ># ># append_logdir_domain(): ># >type $1_log_t; >logging_log_file($1_log_t) >allow $1_t var_log_t:dir ra_dir_perms; >allow $1_t $1_log_t:dir { setattr ra_dir_perms }; >allow $1_t $1_log_t:file { create ra_file_perms }; >type_transition $1_t var_log_t:file $1_log_t; > ># ># application_domain(): ># >type $1_t; >type $1_exec_t; >domain_type($1_t) >domain_entry_file($1_t,$1_exec_t) >libs_use_ld_so($1_t) >libs_use_shared_libs($1_t) ># a "run" interface needs to be ># added, and have sysadm_t use it ># in a optional_policy block. > ># ># base_can_network($1,$2,$3): ># >allow $1 self:$2_socket connected_socket_perms; >corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_if($1) >corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1) >corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) >corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) >corenet_$2_bind_all_nodes($1) >sysnet_read_config($1) ># if $3 is specified (remove _port_t from $3): >corenet_$2_sendrecv_$3_port($1) ># else: >corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_ports($1) > ># ># base_file_read_access(): complete ># >kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1) >corecmd_list_bin($1) >corecmd_read_bin_symlink($1) >corecmd_read_bin_file($1) >corecmd_read_bin_pipe($1) >corecmd_read_bin_socket($1) >corecmd_list_sbin($1) >corecmd_read_sbin_symlink($1) >corecmd_read_sbin_file($1) >corecmd_read_sbin_pipe($1) >corecmd_read_sbin_socket($1) >files_list_home($1) >files_read_usr_files($1) >seutil_read_config($1) >tunable_policy(`read_default_t',` > files_list_default($1) > files_read_default_files($1) > files_read_default_symlinks($1) > files_read_default_sockets($1) > files_read_default_pipes($1) >') > ># ># base_pty_perms(): ># >allow $1_t ptmx_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; >allow $1_t devpts_t:filesystem getattr; >allow $1_t devpts_t:dir { getattr read search }; >dontaudit $1_t bsdpty_device_t:chr_file { getattr read write }; > ># ># can_create($1,$2,$3): complete ># ># for each object class in $3: ># if dir: >allow $1 $2:dir create_dir_perms; ># else if lnk_file: >allow $1 $2:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; ># else: >allow $1 $2:$3 create_file_perms; > ># ># can_create_other_pty(): complete ># >allow $1_t $2_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms setattr }; >term_create_pty($1_t,$2_devpts_t) > ># ># can_create_pty(): complete ># ># $2 may require more conversion >type $1_devpts_t $2; >term_pty($1_devpts_t) >allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms setattr }; >term_create_pty($1_t,$1_devpts_t) > ># ># can_exec_any(): complete ># >corecmd_exec_bin($1) >corecmd_exec_sbin($1) >domain_exec_all_entry_files($1) >files_exec_etc_files($1) >libs_use_ld_so($1) >libs_use_shared_libs($1) >libs_exec_ld_so($1) >libs_exec_lib_files($1) > ># ># can_getcon(): complete ># >allow $1 self:process getattr; >kernel_read_system_state($1) > ># ># can_getsecurity(): complete ># >selinux_get_fs_mount($1) >selinux_validate_context($1) >selinux_compute_access_vector($1) >selinux_compute_create_context($1) >selinux_compute_relabel_context($1) >selinux_compute_user_contexts($1) > ># ># can_kerberos(): complete ># >optional_policy(`kerberos.te',` > kerberos_use($1) >') > ># ># can_ldap(): complete ># >optional_policy(`ldap.te',` > allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; > corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1) > corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1) > corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) > corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) > corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ldap_port($1) > corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1) > sysnet_read_config($1) >') > ># ># can_loadpol(): complete ># >selinux_get_fs_mount($1) >selinux_load_policy($1) > ># ># can_network($1): ># >allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; >allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; >corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1) >corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if($1) >corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1) >corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) >corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) >corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) >corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1) >corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1) >corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1) >corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1) >sysnet_read_config($1) >optional_policy(`mount.te',` > mount_send_nfs_client_request($1) >') > ># ># can_network($1,$2): ># >can_network_tcp($1, `$2') >can_network_udp($1, `$2') >optional_policy(`mount.te',` > mount_send_nfs_client_request($1) >') > ># ># can_network_client(): ># >can_network_client_tcp($1, `$2') >can_network_udp($1, `$2') > ># ># can_network_client_tcp($1): complete ># >allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; >corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1) >corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1) >corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) >corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) >corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1) >corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1) >sysnet_read_config($1) > ># ># can_network_client_tcp($1,$2): ># ># remove _port_t from $2 >allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; >corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1) >corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1) >corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) >corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) >corenet_tcp_sendrecv_$2_port($1) >corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1) >sysnet_read_config($1) > ># ># can_network_server(): ># >allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; >base_can_network($1, tcp, `$2') > ># ># can_network_server_tcp(): ># >allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; >base_can_network($1, tcp, `$2') > ># ># can_network_tcp(): ># >can_network_server_tcp($1, `$2') >can_network_client_tcp($1, `$2') > ># ># can_network_udp(): complete ># >base_can_network($1, udp, `$2') >allow $1 self:udp_socket { connect }; > ># ># can_ps(): ># >allow $1 $2:dir { search getattr read }; >allow $1 $2:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr }; >allow $1 $2:process getattr; ># We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access ># /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels ># (2.4 and 2.6). Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if ># running in a privileged domain. >dontaudit $1 $2:process ptrace; > ># ># can_ptrace(): ># >allow $1 $2:process ptrace; >allow $2 $1:process sigchld; > ># ># can_resolve(): complete ># >tunable_policy(`use_dns',` > allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; > corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if($1) > corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1) > corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) > corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1) > corenet_udp_sendrecv_dns_port($1) > corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1) > sysnet_read_config($1) >') > ># ># can_setbool(): complete ># >selinux_get_fs_mount($1) >selinux_set_boolean($1) > ># ># can_setcon(): complete ># ># get mount point is due to libselinux init ># >allow $1 self:process setcurrent; >selinux_get_fs_mount($1) > ># ># can_setenforce(): complete ># ># get mount point is due to libselinux init ># >selinux_get_fs_mount($1) >selinux_set_enforce_mode($1) > ># ># can_setexec(): complete ># ># get mount point is due to libselinux init ># >allow $1 self:process setexec; >selinux_get_fs_mount($1) > ># ># can_setfscreate(): complete ># ># get mount point is due to libselinux init ># >allow $1 self:process setfscreate; >selinux_get_fs_mount($1) > ># ># can_setsecparam(): complete ># ># get mount point is due to libselinux init ># >selinux_get_fs_mount($1) >kernel_setsecparam($1) > ># ># can_sysctl(): complete ># >kernel_rw_all_sysctl($1) > ># ># can_tcp_connect(): ># >allow $1 $2:tcp_socket { connectto recvfrom }; >allow $2 $1:tcp_socket { acceptfrom recvfrom }; >allow $2 kernel_t:tcp_socket recvfrom; >allow $1 kernel_t:tcp_socket recvfrom; > ># ># can_udp_send(): ># >allow $1 $2:udp_socket sendto; >allow $2 $1:udp_socket recvfrom; > ># ># can_unix_connect(): ># >allow $1 $2:unix_stream_socket connectto; > ># ># can_unix_send(): ># >allow $1 $2:unix_dgram_socket sendto; > ># ># can_ypbind(): complete ># >optional_policy(`nis.te',` > nis_use_ypbind($1) >') > ># ># create_append_log_file(): ># >allow $1 $2:dir { read getattr search add_name write }; >allow $1 $2:file { create ioctl getattr setattr append link }; > ># ># create_dir_file(): ># >allow $1 $2:dir create_dir_perms; >allow $1 $2:file create_file_perms; >allow $1 $2:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; > ># ># create_dir_notdevfile(): ># >allow $1 $2:dir create_dir_perms; >allow $1 $2:{ file sock_file fifo_file } create_file_perms; >allow $1 $2:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; > ># ># daemon_base_domain(): ># >type $1_t; >type $1_exec_t; >init_daemon_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t) >dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config; >allow $1_t self:process signal_perms; >kernel_list_proc($1_t) >kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t) >kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t) >dev_read_sysfs($1_t) >fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_t) >term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t) >domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_t) >init_use_fd($1_t) >init_use_script_pty($1_t) >libs_use_ld_so($1_t) >libs_use_shared_libs($1_t) >logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t) >userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd($1_t) >ifdef(`targeted_policy',` > term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t) > term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t) > files_dontaudit_read_root_file($1_t) >') >optional_policy(`selinuxutil.te',` > seutil_sigchld_newrole($1_t) >') >optional_policy(`udev.te', ` > udev_read_db($1_t) >') >ifdef(`TODO',` >optional_policy(`rhgb.te',` > rhgb_domain($1_t) >') >') dnl end TODO > ># ># daemon_domain(): ># >type $1_t; >type $1_exec_t; >init_daemon_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t) >type $1_var_run_t; >files_pid_file($1_var_run_t) >dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config; >allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms; >allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:dir rw_dir_perms; >files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t) >kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t) >kernel_list_proc($1_t) >kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t) >dev_read_sysfs($1_t) >fs_getattr_all_fs($1_t) >fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_t) >term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t) >domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_t) >init_use_fd($1_t) >init_use_script_pty($1_t) >libs_use_ld_so($1_t) >libs_use_shared_libs($1_t) >logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t) >miscfiles_read_localization($1_t) >userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd($1_t) >userdom_dontaudit_search_sysadm_home_dir($1_t) >ifdef(`targeted_policy', ` > term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t) > term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t) > files_dontaudit_read_root_file($1_t) >') >optional_policy(`selinuxutil.te',` > seutil_sigchld_newrole($1_t) >') >optional_policy(`udev.te', ` > udev_read_db($1_t) >') >ifdef(`TODO',` >optional_policy(`rhgb.te',` > rhgb_domain($1_t) >') >') dnl end TODO > ># ># daemon_sub_domain(): ># ># $3 may need more work >type $2_t; #, daemon $3; >domain_type($2_t) >type $2_exec_t; >domain_entry_file($2_t,$2_exec_t) >role system_r types $2_t; >allow $2_t self:process signal_perms; >domain_auto_trans($1, $2_exec_t, $2_t) >logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t) >libs_use_ld_so($2_t) >libs_use_shared_libs($2_t) >kernel_list_proc($1_t) >kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t) > ># ># etc_domain(): complete ># >type $1_etc_t; #, usercanread; >files_type($1_etc_t) >allow $1_t $1_etc_t:file { getattr read }; >files_search_etc($1_t) > ># ># etcdir_domain(): complete ># >type $1_etc_t; #, usercanread; >files_file_type($1_etc_t) >allow $1_t $1_etc_t:file r_file_perms; >allow $1_t $1_etc_t:dir r_dir_perms; >allow $1_t $1_etc_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; >files_search_etc($1_t) > ># ># file_type_auto_trans($1,$2,$3): complete ># >allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms; >allow $1 $3:dir create_dir_perms; >allow $1 $3:file create_file_perms; >allow $1 $3:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; >allow $1 $3:sock_file create_file_perms; >allow $1 $3:fifo_file create_file_perms; >type_transition $1 $2:{ file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } $3; > ># ># file_type_auto_trans($1,$2,$3,$4): complete ># >allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms; ># for each i in $4: >can_create_internal($1,$3,$i) >type_transition $1 $2:$i $3; > ># ># general_domain_access(): complete ># >allow $1 self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; >allow $1 self:fd use; >allow $1 self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; >allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; >allow $1 self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; >allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket sendto; >allow $1 self:unix_stream_socket connectto; >allow $1 self:shm create_shm_perms; >allow $1 self:sem create_sem_perms; >allow $1 self:msgq create_msgq_perms; >allow $1 self:msg { send receive }; >fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1) >userdom_use_unpriv_users_fd($1) >optional_policy(`nis.te',` > nis_use_ypbind($1) >') > ># ># general_proc_read_access(): complete ># >kernel_read_system_state($1) >kernel_read_network_state($1) >kernel_read_software_raid_state($1) >kernel_getattr_core($1) >kernel_getattr_message_if($1) >kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1) > ># ># in_user_role(): ># ># this is replaced by run interfaces > ># ># init_service_domain(): complete ># >type $1_t; >type $1_exec_t; >init_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t) >dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config; >allow self:process signal_perms; >kernel_list_proc($1_t) >kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t) >dev_read_sysfs($1_t) >term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t) >libs_use_ld_so($1_t) >libs_use_shared_libs($1_t) >logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t) >userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd($1_t) >ifdef(`targeted_policy',` > term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t) > term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t) > files_dontaudit_read_root_file($1_t) >') >optional_policy(`udev.te',` > udev_read_db($1_t) >') > ># ># inetd_child_domain(): ># >type $1_t; >type $1_exec_t; >inetd_(udp_|tcp_)?service_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t) >role system_r types $1_t; >type $1_tmp_t; >files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t) >type $1_var_run_t; >files_pid_file($1_var_run_t) >allow $1_t self:process signal_perms; >allow $1_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; >allow $1_t self:tcp_socket connected_stream_socket_perms; ># for identd ># cjp: this should probably only be inetd_child rules? >allow $1_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; >allow $1_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; >allow $1_t self:dir search; >allow $1_t self:{ lnk_file file } { getattr read }; >files_search_home($1_t) >optional_policy(`kerberos.te',` > kerberos_use($1_t) >') >#end for identd >allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms; >allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file create_file_perms; >files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file dir }) >allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms; >files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t) >kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t) >kernel_read_system_state($1_t) >kernel_read_network_state($1_t) >corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1_t) >corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1_t) >corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_t) >corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_t) >corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_t) >corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_t) >dev_read_urand($1_t) >fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_t) >files_read_etc_files($1_t) >libs_use_ld_so($1_t) >libs_use_shared_libs($1_t) >logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t) >miscfiles_read_localization($1_t) >sysnet_read_config($1_t) >optional_policy(`nis.te',` > nis_use_ypbind($1_t) >') >optional_policy(`nscd.te',` > nscd_use_socket($1_t) >') > ># ># legacy_domain(): complete ># >allow $1_t self:process execmem; >libs_legacy_use_shared_libs($1_t) >libs_legacy_use_ld_so($1_t) > ># ># lock_domain(): complete ># >type $1_lock_t; >files_lock_file($1_lock_t) >allow $1_t $1_lock_t:file create_file_perms; >files_create_lock($1_t,$1_lock_t) > ># ># log_domain(): complete ># >type $1_log_t; >logging_log_file($1_log_t) >allow $1_t $1_log_t:file create_file_perms; >logging_create_log($1_t,$1_log_t) > ># ># logdir_domain(): complete ># >type $1_log_t; >logging_log_file($1_log_t) >allow $1_t $1_log_t:file create_file_perms; >allow $1_t $1_log_t:dir rw_dir_perms; >logging_create_log($1_t,$1_log_t,{ file dir }) > ># ># network_home_dir(): ># >create_dir_file($1, $2) >can_exec($1, $2) >allow $1 $2:{ sock_file fifo_file } { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; > ># ># pty_slave_label(): ># >type $1_devpts_t, file_type, sysadmfile, ptyfile $2; >allow $1_devpts_t devpts_t:filesystem associate; >type_transition $1_t devpts_t:chr_file $1_devpts_t; >allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms }; > ># ># r_dir_file(): complete ># >allow $1 $2:dir { getattr read search }; >allow $1 $2:file { read getattr }; >allow $1 $2:lnk_file { getattr read }; > ># ># ra_dir_create_file(): complete ># >allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms; >allow $1 $2:file { create ra_file_perms }; >allow $1 $2:lnk_file { create read getattr }; > ># ># ra_dir_file(): complete ># >allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms; >allow $1 $2:file ra_file_perms; >allow $1 $2:lnk_file { getattr read }; > ># ># read_locale(): complete ># >miscfiles_read_localization($1) > ># ># read_sysctl($1): complete ># >kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1) > ># ># read_sysctl($1,full): complete ># >kernel_read_all_sysctl($1) > ># ># rhgb_domain(): ># > ># ># rw_dir_create_file(): complete ># >allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms; >allow $1 $2:file create_file_perms; >allow $1 $2:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; > ># ># rw_dir_file(): complete ># ># cjp: rw_dir_perms here doesnt make sense >allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms; >allow $1 $2:file rw_file_perms; >allow $1 $2:lnk_file { getattr read }; > ># ># system_domain(): complete ># >type $1_t; >type $1_exec_t; >init_system_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t) >files_list_etc($1_t) >libs_use_ld_so($1_t) >libs_use_shared_libs($1_t) >logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t) > ># ># tmp_domain($1): complete ># >type $1_tmp_t; >files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t) >allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms; >allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file create_file_perms; >files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file dir }) > ># ># tmp_domain($1,$2,$3): complete ># ># $2 may need more handling ># >type $1_tmp_t $2; >files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t) >allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:$3 manage_obj_perms; >files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $3) > ># ># tmpfs_domain(): complete ># >type $1_tmpfs_t; >files_tmpfs_file($1_tmpfs_t) >allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write }; >allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; >allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename }; >allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; >allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; >filesystem_create_private_tmpfs_data($1_t,$1_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) > ># ># unconfined_domain(): complete ># >unconfined_domain_template($1) > ># ># user_application_domain(): complete ># >type $1_t $2; >domain_type($1_t) >type $1_exec_t; >domain_entry_file($1_t,$1_exec_t) >libs_use_ld_so($1_t) >libs_use_shared_libs($1_t) >logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t) ># a "run" interface needs to be ># added, and use it in the base user domain ># template, in a optional_policy block. > ># ># uses_authbind(): ># >domain_auto_trans($1, authbind_exec_t, authbind_t) >allow authbind_t $1:process sigchld; >allow authbind_t $1:fd use; >allow authbind_t $1:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } rw_socket_perms; > ># ># uses_shlib(): complete ># >libs_use_ld_so($1) >libs_use_shared_libs($1) > ># ># var_lib_domain(): complete ># >type $1_var_lib_t; >files_type($1_var_lib_t) >allow $1_t $1_var_lib_t:file create_file_perms; >allow $1_t $1_var_lib_t:dir create_dir_perms; >files_create_var_lib($1_t,$1_var_lib_t) > ># ># var_run_domain($1): complete ># >type $1_var_run_t; >files_pid_file($1_var_run_t) >allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms; >allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms; >files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t) > ># ># var_run_domain($1,$2): complete ># >type $1_var_run_t; >files_pid_file($1_var_run_t) >files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t,$2) ># for each object class in $2: ># if dir: >allow $1 $1_var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms; ># else if lnk_file: >allow $1 $1_var_run_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; ># else: >allow $1 $1_var_run_t:$2 create_file_perms; > > Ok, I have begun playing with the reference policy trying to build the modules version. So far not much luck. checkmodule does not like the syntax for "module devices 1.0;" -- -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.