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From: "Ky Srinivasan" <ksrinivasan@novell.com>
To: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
Subject: Re: xm mem-max and mem-set
Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 07:30:10 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <443F6BA0.E57C.0030.0@novell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <443EFF80.7060005@us.ibm.com>

The patch I have is for the hypervisor. The reason for the crash is the
current Linux code cannot deal with a failure when it tries to give up a
contiguous region and repopulate the the region with potentially
non-contiguous pages (refer to hypervisor.c for this).

Regards,

K. Y 
 
>>> Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> 04/13/06 9:48 pm >>> 
Ky Srinivasan wrote:
> It appears that these commands (and code backing these commands) do
no
> sanity checking and could potentially get the system to crash if the
> values picked are not appropriate. For instance one can set the mem-
max
> value to a value that appears reasonable and basically render the
> machine unusable. Consider the case where max value being set is
less
> than what is currently allocated to the domain. All subsequent
> allocations will fail and these failures are considered fatal in
Linux
> (look at hypervisor.c). Once the domain is up, does it even make
sense
> to lower the max_mem parameter without risking crashing the system?
> Minimally, we should ensure that the mem_max value is at least equal
to
> what the current domain allocation is. I have a trivial patch to xen
> that implements this logic. This patch fixes a bug we have in our
> bugzilla against SLES10. Would there be interest in such a patch. 
>   

I'm slightly concerned about the subtle race condition it would 
introduce.  If there's no reason to set max- mem below current 
reservation (if it causes crashes which I don't really understand why
it 
would) then I think it would be something best enforced within the 
hypervisor.

Why, exactly, would setting max- mem below the current reservation
cause 
problems in the guest?  I guess it may fail because of grant transfer 
ops (in which case, we really ought to enforce it at the hypervisor
level).

Regards,

Anthony Liguori

> Regards,
>
> K. Y
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen- devel mailing list
> Xen- devel@lists.xensource.com
> http://lists.xensource.com/xen- devel
>   


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      parent reply	other threads:[~2006-04-14 13:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-04-14  0:33 xm mem-max and mem-set Ky Srinivasan
2006-04-14  1:48 ` Anthony Liguori
2006-04-14  6:55   ` Keir Fraser
2006-04-14 13:30   ` Ky Srinivasan [this message]

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