All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
To: russell@coker.com.au
Cc: SE-Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: MMCS patch against subversion policy
Date: Sat, 07 Oct 2006 06:26:11 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <452780C3.3090809@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200610071118.18718.russell@coker.com.au>

Russell Coker wrote:
> On Saturday 07 October 2006 05:19, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> wrote:
>   
>> Russell Coker wrote:
>> This is fine.  The only problem we have seen with MMCS is when an
>> administrator logs in at SystemLow and su to root they have to be able
>> to see and kill processes running at different levels.
>> They should also be able to run the debugger against them.    If I am
>> not using MCS I should not be hindered by it.
>>     
>
> So you give the administrator the range SystemLow-SystemHigh and that's 
> covered.  I can't imagine why you would want to give the administrator any 
> different range.
>   
We do not define administrators in targeted policy.  There is only 
unconfined users.  All users in by default login with s0, not 
SystemLow-SystemHigh.  We could make that change but then it would get 
harder to turn on MCS as you would need to start thinking in terms of 
administators.
>   
>>> The controversial patch is relabelling certain files under /selinux to
>>> SystemHigh (it also needs restorecon run from /etc/rc.sysinit).  I know
>>> that Steve won't like this and anticipate that others might not either. 
>>> That's OK, the other two patches are useful without it.
>>>       
>> Not sure why you want to do this?
>>     
>
> So that you can't trivially escape from the MCS part of the policy as root.
>
>   

MCS Was designed as a descretionary mechanism,  so I don't have a 
problem with this.  If I become admin I can easily change my roles using 
semanage anyways, so this is not a security issue.  Maybe in the future 
we can experiment with this, but for RHEL5, when a normal administrator 
logs onto a system, he is unconfined_t and when he becomes root he needs 
to be able to control the processes on the system.  targeted policy is 
not about controlling the logged in user, yet.

--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

  reply	other threads:[~2006-10-07 10:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-10-06 11:09 MMCS patch against subversion policy Russell Coker
2006-10-06 19:19 ` Daniel J Walsh
2006-10-07  1:18   ` Russell Coker
2006-10-07 10:26     ` Daniel J Walsh [this message]
2006-10-07 11:13       ` Russell Coker
2006-10-07 11:28         ` Daniel J Walsh
2006-10-07 11:59           ` Russell Coker
2006-10-09 12:54         ` Christopher J. PeBenito

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=452780C3.3090809@redhat.com \
    --to=dwalsh@redhat.com \
    --cc=russell@coker.com.au \
    --cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.