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From: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com>
To: Joshua Brindle <jbrindle@tresys.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Ability to allow unknown class and permissions
Date: Mon, 04 Dec 2006 15:33:05 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <45748601.6020707@mentalrootkit.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6FE441CD9F0C0C479F2D88F959B015885C82D7@exchange.columbia.tresys.com>

Joshua Brindle wrote:
>> From: Karl MacMillan [mailto:kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com] 
>>
>> Joshua Brindle wrote:
>>>> From: Karl MacMillan [mailto:kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com]
>> <snip>
>>
>>>>> It doesn't give the interface I don't think, but it does let us 
>>>>> redefine user object classes without worrying about the
>>>> kernel rejecting it.
>>>> Not certain I understand this comment either.
>>>>
>>> Perhaps I misunderstood your points, I didn't see how they 
>> applied to 
>>> this exactly either. How is adding an option to the policy 
>> config to 
>>> ignore unknown permissions resulting in an interface to help with 
>>> dynamic object classes?
>> My understanding of the current suggestion is:
>>
>> 1) A policy flag indicating that unknown object classes and 
>> permissions should be ignored.
>> 2) load_policy / libsemanage changed to optionally generate 
>> avtab entries for unknown object classes or permissions based on 1.
>>
>> In order to accomplish 2, load_policy / libsemanage will have 
>> to be able to compare the object classes and permissions that 
>> the kernel currently knows about to the ones referenced in 
>> the policy. Hence a kernel interface exporting information 
>> about the object classes and permissions of which the kernel is aware.
>>
> 
> Why do you need #2 if you have #1?

Having the kernel change the loaded policy has a number of problems 
including putting complex code in the kernel and difficulty obtaining 
the changed policy for analysis / debugging. Assuming that most users 
don't upgrade to new kernels often it seems preferable to leave this 
compatibility code in userspace.

  Or Why would you need #1 if you have
> #2? I thought the config flag was for the kernel..

To allow the policy file to be analyzed without external reference.

Karl

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2006-12-04 20:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-12-01 16:06 [RFC] Ability to allow unknown class and permissions Eric Paris
2006-12-01 17:18 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-01 18:41 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-02  3:28   ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 14:46     ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-04 15:11       ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 15:24         ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-04 18:13           ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 18:49             ` Eric Paris
2006-12-04 19:39               ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-04 20:06                 ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 20:11                   ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 20:15                     ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 20:18                       ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 20:25                         ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 20:28                           ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 20:25                             ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-04 20:34                               ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 20:44                                 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-04 21:05                                   ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-05 13:31                                     ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-05 13:59                                       ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 20:33                             ` Karl MacMillan [this message]
2006-12-04 21:19                               ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 21:34                                 ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 23:20                                   ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-05 13:41                                     ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-05 13:33                                 ` Stephen Smalley

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