From: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Pilger <pilger.david@gmail.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
Subject: Re: Regarding Xen security....
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2007 14:17:03 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <45ABE13F.7070806@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <280848580701150418q46ad0dedtcd250f5f4632914c@mail.gmail.com>
David Pilger wrote:
> Search for "HVM rootkits",
The vast majority of this is, as Keith Adams put its, "quasi-illiterate
gibberish."
http://x86vmm.blogspot.com/2006/08/blue-pill-is-quasi-illiterate.html
Having VT/SVM doesn't really change anything wrt rootkits. Most of what
is floating around is FUD. There's nothing you can do today that you
couldn't do before VT/SVM.
Regards,
Anthony Liguori
if your system runs without a hypervisor
> and VMX/SVM is enabled in the BIOS then an attacker can gain control
> over that layer. But he'll first need to gain control over the
> operating system (not so difficult) in order to execute a program with
> high privileges. In "VMX root operation" you have total control over
> the system (parallel to ring0, one year ago).
>
> VT-x is intended to provide another ring of security (priviliges),
> which lets hypervisors manage unmodified operating systems.
>
> Right now, if you are not running a hypervisor than it's not secure to
> enable VT-x in the BIOS, if you do use some kind of hypervisor, then
> the threat is that an attacker will find a security hole in it and
> take control over that layer. Right now, there aren't any known
> vulnerabilities in software the manage VMX. But I guess that the focus
> of malicious people is not exactly at hypervisors. When LaGrande (for
> instance) will be a part of any computer, then it will be "benefitial"
> to search for vulnerabilities in this layer.
>
> In summary, there is a risk when no hypervisor occupies the VMX layer
> and it is enabled in the BIOS. The only use of this layer by a
> malicious program is for properly hiding itself from removal tools.
>
> Any way, here are some insights:
> * If operating systems were secure enough and properly programmed then
> VMX was not needed in this regard (to provide security).
> * The implementation of VMX is here to take the control of the machine
> from a certain operating system, treating an OS just like a "process".
> * Its useful for servers that runs virtual machines, this is trivial
> use of a hypervisors.
>
> David.
>
>
> On 1/12/07, Praveen Kushwaha <praveen.kushwaha@nechclst.in> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Sir,
>>
>> I have a question regarding the security of Xen. What are
>> the
>> security threats in with Intel VT-x.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Praveen Kushwaha
>>
>>
>>
>> _____________________________________________________________________________________________
>>
>>
>> NEC HCL System Technologies Ltd., 4th Floor, Tower B, Logix Techno Park,
>> Noida | Tel: 120 436 6777 Extn 748
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Xen-devel mailing list
>> Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
>> http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
>>
>>
>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-01-15 20:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-01-12 10:13 Regarding Xen security Praveen Kushwaha
2007-01-15 11:47 ` Petersson, Mats
2007-01-15 12:18 ` David Pilger
2007-01-15 12:55 ` Petersson, Mats
2007-01-15 17:05 ` David Pilger
2007-01-15 20:17 ` Anthony Liguori [this message]
2007-01-16 7:56 ` David Pilger
2007-01-17 3:06 ` Mark Williamson
2007-01-17 5:38 ` Anthony Liguori
2007-04-24 6:13 ` could netcard be hotplug into a running VM? tgh
2007-04-24 9:03 ` Petersson, Mats
2007-04-24 12:33 ` tgh
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