From: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
To: Todd Miller <Tmiller@tresys.com>
Cc: Klaus Weidner <klaus@atsec.com>,
James Antill <jantill@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>,
SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Fedora Core 7 has frozen and Fedora 8 Development has started
Date: Tue, 22 May 2007 12:00:01 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <46531381.6050101@manicmethod.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6FE441CD9F0C0C479F2D88F959B01588BEFCD4@exchange.columbia.tresys.com>
Todd Miller wrote:
> Joshua Brindle wrote:
>
>> What does allowable file context mean?
>>
>> You need to be able to do an analysis on the policy to see what user
>> can relabelfrom and what they can relabelto. If they can't
>> relabelfrom the file being modified in nautilus then nothing should
>> appear, otherwise the types they can relabelto would appear.
>>
>
> A security_get_file_sids() function was added to the security server
> that takes a usersid and a class (was always SECLASS_FILE) and returns a
> list of sids that the user has relabelto permissions. It was probably
> not really sufficient for the task as it doesn't take relabelfrom into
> account (it predates any hacking I did on SEDarwin, though I did stop it
> from panicing).
>
> The kernel code in question is still online at:
> http://sedarwin.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/sedarwin8/policies/sedarwin/sedarwin/
> ss/services.c
>
it also ignores other parts of a context so it isn't really sufficient,
if the type can be relabeledfrom and to but the user is different a
contraint will prevent the relabel, for example. It also doesn't take
any mls/mcs into account.
I also think it isn't appropriate to do analysis of the policy in the
kernel, a better alternative might be to make a kernel interface to
output the policydb that an apol-like daemon could read and perform
queries on when requested.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-05-22 16:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-05-18 20:59 Fedora Core 7 has frozen and Fedora 8 Development has started Daniel J Walsh
2007-05-21 19:08 ` Klaus Weidner
2007-05-21 19:15 ` Daniel J Walsh
2007-05-21 19:43 ` Paul Moore
2007-05-21 20:27 ` James Antill
2007-05-21 22:13 ` Klaus Weidner
2007-05-22 1:34 ` Paul Moore
2007-05-22 13:31 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-05-22 14:54 ` Todd Miller
2007-05-22 15:14 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-05-22 15:36 ` Todd Miller
2007-05-22 16:00 ` Joshua Brindle [this message]
2007-05-23 14:01 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-05-22 14:51 ` James Antill
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