From: Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com>
Cc: jwcart2@epoch.ncsc.mil, SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Joshua Brindle <jbrindle@tresys.com>,
"Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] libselinux: class and permission mapping support (try 3)
Date: Fri, 08 Jun 2007 13:30:25 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <46699231.4030704@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1181225909.7049.15.camel@localhost.localdomain>
This patch includes the internal map and unmap functions and
the changes to the selinuxfs interfaces to make it work.
Signed-off-by: Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
compute_av.c | 8 ++++++--
compute_create.c | 5 +++--
compute_member.c | 5 +++--
compute_relabel.c | 5 +++--
mapping.h | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
stringrep.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
6 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
Index: libselinux/src/mapping.h
===================================================================
--- libselinux/src/mapping.h (revision 0)
+++ libselinux/src/mapping.h (revision 0)
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * This file describes the class and permission mappings used to
+ * hide the kernel numbers from userspace by allowing userspace object
+ * managers to specify a list of classes and permissions.
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_MAPPING_H_
+#define _SELINUX_MAPPING_H_
+
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+
+/*
+ * Get real, kernel values from mapped values
+ */
+
+extern security_class_t
+unmap_class(security_class_t tclass);
+
+extern access_vector_t
+unmap_perm(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t tperm);
+
+/*
+ * Get mapped values from real, kernel values
+ */
+
+extern security_class_t
+map_class(security_class_t kclass);
+
+extern access_vector_t
+map_perm(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t kperm);
+
+extern void
+map_decision(security_class_t tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_MAPPING_H_ */
Index: libselinux/src/stringrep.c
===================================================================
--- libselinux/src/stringrep.c (revision 2470)
+++ libselinux/src/stringrep.c (working copy)
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
#include "selinux_internal.h"
#include "policy.h"
+#include "mapping.h"
#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0]))
@@ -315,12 +316,12 @@
if (isdigit(s[0])) {
val = atoi(s);
if (val > 0 && val < NCLASSES)
- return val;
+ return map_class(val);
} else {
for (val = 0; val < NCLASSES; val++) {
if (strcmp(s, (class_to_string_data.str
+ class_to_string[val])) == 0)
- return val;
+ return map_class(val);
}
}
@@ -333,9 +334,10 @@
const uint16_t *common_pts_idx = 0;
access_vector_t perm, common_base = 0;
unsigned int i;
+ security_class_t kclass = unmap_class(tclass);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit); i++) {
- if (av_inherit[i].tclass == tclass) {
+ if (av_inherit[i].tclass == kclass) {
common_pts_idx =
&common_perm_to_string.data[av_inherit[i].
common_pts_idx];
@@ -350,16 +352,16 @@
if (strcmp
(s,
common_perm_to_string_data.str + common_pts_idx[i]) == 0)
- return perm;
+ return map_perm(tclass, perm);
perm <<= 1;
i++;
}
for (i = 0; i < NVECTORS; i++) {
- if ((av_perm_to_string[i].tclass == tclass) &&
+ if ((av_perm_to_string[i].tclass == kclass) &&
(strcmp(s, (av_perm_to_string_data.str
+ av_perm_to_string[i].nameidx)) == 0))
- return av_perm_to_string[i].value;
+ return map_perm(tclass, av_perm_to_string[i].value);
}
errno = EINVAL;
@@ -368,6 +370,8 @@
static const char *security_class_to_string_compat(security_class_t tclass)
{
+ tclass = unmap_class(tclass);
+
if (tclass > 0 && tclass < NCLASSES)
return class_to_string_data.str + class_to_string[tclass];
@@ -382,6 +386,9 @@
access_vector_t common_base = 0;
unsigned int i;
+ av = unmap_perm(tclass, av);
+ tclass = unmap_class(tclass);
+
if (!av)
return NULL;
@@ -432,22 +439,23 @@
}
}
- return node->value;
+ return map_class(node->value);
}
access_vector_t string_to_av_perm(security_class_t tclass, const char *s)
{
struct discover_class_node *node;
+ security_class_t kclass = unmap_class(tclass);
if (obj_class_compat)
return string_to_av_perm_compat(tclass,s);
- node = get_class_cache_entry_value(tclass);
+ node = get_class_cache_entry_value(kclass);
if (node != NULL) {
size_t i;
for (i=0; i<MAXVECTORS && node->perms[i] != NULL; i++)
if (strcmp(node->perms[i],s) == 0)
- return (1<<i);
+ return map_perm(tclass, 1<<i);
}
errno = EINVAL;
@@ -461,6 +469,7 @@
if (obj_class_compat)
return security_class_to_string_compat(tclass);
+ tclass = unmap_class(tclass);
node = get_class_cache_entry_value(tclass);
if (node == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
@@ -478,6 +487,8 @@
if (obj_class_compat)
return security_av_perm_to_string_compat(tclass,av);
+ av = unmap_perm(tclass, av);
+ tclass = unmap_class(tclass);
node = get_class_cache_entry_value(tclass);
if (av && node)
for (i = 0; i<MAXVECTORS; i++)
Index: libselinux/src/compute_av.c
===================================================================
--- libselinux/src/compute_av.c (revision 2470)
+++ libselinux/src/compute_av.c (working copy)
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include "selinux_internal.h"
#include "policy.h"
-#include <limits.h>
+#include "mapping.h"
int security_compute_av_raw(security_context_t scon,
security_context_t tcon,
@@ -36,7 +37,8 @@
goto out;
}
- snprintf(buf, len, "%s %s %hu %x", scon, tcon, tclass, requested);
+ snprintf(buf, len, "%s %s %hu %x", scon, tcon,
+ unmap_class(tclass), unmap_perm(tclass, requested));
ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf));
if (ret < 0)
@@ -54,6 +56,8 @@
goto out2;
}
+ map_decision(tclass, avd);
+
ret = 0;
out2:
free(buf);
Index: libselinux/src/compute_create.c
===================================================================
--- libselinux/src/compute_create.c (revision 2470)
+++ libselinux/src/compute_create.c (working copy)
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include "selinux_internal.h"
#include "policy.h"
-#include <limits.h>
+#include "mapping.h"
int security_compute_create_raw(security_context_t scon,
security_context_t tcon,
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
- snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, tclass);
+ snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, unmap_class(tclass));
ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf));
if (ret < 0)
Index: libselinux/src/compute_member.c
===================================================================
--- libselinux/src/compute_member.c (revision 2470)
+++ libselinux/src/compute_member.c (working copy)
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include "selinux_internal.h"
#include "policy.h"
-#include <limits.h>
+#include "mapping.h"
int security_compute_member_raw(security_context_t scon,
security_context_t tcon,
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
- snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, tclass);
+ snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, unmap_class(tclass));
ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf));
if (ret < 0)
Index: libselinux/src/compute_relabel.c
===================================================================
--- libselinux/src/compute_relabel.c (revision 2470)
+++ libselinux/src/compute_relabel.c (working copy)
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include "selinux_internal.h"
#include "policy.h"
-#include <limits.h>
+#include "mapping.h"
int security_compute_relabel_raw(security_context_t scon,
security_context_t tcon,
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
- snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, tclass);
+ snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, unmap_class(tclass));
ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf));
if (ret < 0)
--
Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
National Security Agency
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-06-08 17:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-06-06 15:42 [PATCH 1/2] libselinux: class and permission mapping support Eamon Walsh
2007-06-06 15:45 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-06-06 16:32 ` Eamon Walsh
2007-06-06 15:59 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-06 16:24 ` Eamon Walsh
2007-06-06 16:40 ` James Carter
2007-06-06 18:32 ` [PATCH 1/2] libselinux: class and permission mapping support (try 2) Eamon Walsh
2007-06-06 18:34 ` [PATCH 2/2] " Eamon Walsh
2007-06-07 14:18 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-06-08 17:26 ` [PATCH 1/3] libselinux: class and permission mapping support (try 3) Eamon Walsh
2007-06-08 17:28 ` [PATCH 2/3] " Eamon Walsh
2007-06-08 17:30 ` Eamon Walsh [this message]
2007-06-08 20:00 ` [PATCH 3/3] " Stephen Smalley
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