From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Message-ID: <4680DCC8.1000704@domain.hid> Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2007 11:30:48 +0200 From: Jan Kiszka MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <0B45E93C5FF65740AEAE690BF3848B7A4AB14C@rennsmail04.eu.thmulti.com> <4680DA9B.5020501@domain.hid> In-Reply-To: <4680DA9B.5020501@domain.hid> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="------------enigA83749417C526FB1D0B08710" Sender: jan.kiszka@domain.hid Subject: Re: [Xenomai-core] [Xenomai-help] Group-based RT caps List-Id: "Xenomai life and development \(bug reports, patches, discussions\)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: xenomai-core This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 2440 and 3156) --------------enigA83749417C526FB1D0B08710 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-15 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Jan Kiszka wrote: > Hi, >=20 > I'm moving this thread to xenomai-core as I have some implementation id= ea... >=20 > Fillod Stephane wrote: >> ... >> I think Johan was not asking to disable the mlockall, but to allow som= e. >> non-root user to be able to do it. He found his solution anyway, which= >> is worth an entry in the FAQ. >> >> Since it is going to be a FAQ for those people in embedded business, >> some >> tricks to allow non-root operation of mlockall, SCHED_FIFO, etc., woul= d >> be=20 >> useful. For example, you may hack the commoncap in linux/security/,=20 >> or a better solution would be to rely on realtime-lsm[1][2], thanks to= =20 >> the audio folks. >> >> [1] http://sourceforge.net/projects/realtime-lsm/ >> [2] http://lwn.net/Articles/110346/ >> >=20 > I think we could and should incorporate such a feature into the nucleus= =2E >=20 > There is already code in xnshadow_map playing with cap_effective, but > that happens too late. Instead, we should establish a group-based acces= s > control just like rt-lsm (the other knobs of that module are either > irrelevant for Xenomai (mlock=3D0) or broken security-wise (any=3D1)) a= nd > raise the required caps for a process that belongs to the specified > group, likely when an Xenomai interface gets attached by that process. At this chance we should also remove CONFIG_XENO_OPT_SECURITY_ACCESS and make the check mandatory. Due to the mlockall test, we effectively demand raised privileges already. So there is no use in leaving other Xenomai services open for non-privileged users. Jan --------------enigA83749417C526FB1D0B08710 Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFGgNzIniDOoMHTA+kRAq7tAJ98lh4Sxzunc4XXnKKKn2kCEr4M9wCeM0nt zwIhzwlUPhf9//f9FbBHez4= =YgFx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --------------enigA83749417C526FB1D0B08710--