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From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
To: "Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH] refpolicy: kernel_kernel changes
Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2007 09:17:09 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <46BC6555.9010802@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1186497721.18881.27.camel@gorn>

Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On Thu, 2007-08-02 at 16:04 -0400, dwalsh@redhat.com wrote:
>   
>> Additional interfaces for kernel access
>>
>> @@ -1848,6 +1866,27 @@
>>
>>  ########################################
>>  ## <summary>
>> +##     Read the process state (/proc/pid) of all unlabeled_t.
>> +## </summary>
>> +## <param name="domain">
>> +##     <summary>
>> +##     Domain allowed access.
>> +##     </summary>
>> +## </param>
>> +#
>> +interface(`kernel_read_unlabeled_state',`
>> +       gen_require(`
>> +               type unlabeled_t;
>> +       ')
>> +
>> +       allow $1 unlabeled_t:dir list_dir_perms;
>> +       read_files_pattern($1,unlabeled_t,unlabeled_t)
>> +       read_lnk_files_pattern($1,unlabeled_t,unlabeled_t)
>> +')
>>     
>
> I'm concerned about this interface since unlabled_t is used for domains
> and objects.  Someone using this interface might not realize the
> specified domain can now also read other unlabeled files.
>
>   
The only domain that gets assigned this is sysadm_t.  I believe this was 
needed in order to kill processes that were in the unlabeled state.  For 
example if a sysadm unloads a policy file for a running process.  The 
process goes wild eating up all of cpu, and he can't kill it or even see 
which process is causing the problem.

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  reply	other threads:[~2007-08-10 13:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-08-02 20:04 [PATCH] refpolicy: kernel_kernel changes dwalsh
2007-08-07 14:42 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2007-08-10 13:17   ` Daniel J Walsh [this message]
2007-08-10 15:04     ` Christopher J. PeBenito

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