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From: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, paul.moore@hp.com
Subject: Re: [patch 2/2] Peersid capability support
Date: Wed, 07 Nov 2007 16:23:23 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <47322CCB.4020801@manicmethod.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1194469634.3956.174.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>

Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Wed, 2007-11-07 at 15:50 -0500, Joshua Brindle wrote:
>   
>> plain text document attachment (peersid_cap.patch)
>> Peersid capability support, keys the peersid capability on the peer object class.
>>     
>
> I'm uneasy about this approach, as it is similar to what we originally
> tried for secmark - tying the compat_net setting to the presence of the
> packet class in the policy, except there we were doing it at policy load
> time.  As it turned out, we had policies that defined the packet class
> well before we had usable rule sets for them, and even if we had covered
> that angle, presence/absence of a class definition doesn't reflect
> policy writer intent (e.g. does he want legacy network controls or
> secmark irrespective of whether he is using a modern policy), so we went
> back to manual setting of compat_net.
>
> What if the base.conf / policy.conf itself had an explicit declaration
> of the capabilities to be enabled?  We can certainly do sanity checks
> too (e.g. if they ask for this capability but haven't defined the
> requisite class, that's a bug in their policy), but that would let
> someone use the latest policy flask definitions but still select what
> they want to enable/disable explicitly, and no unwitting enabling of
> capabilities by side effect.
>
>   

I just implemented the last thing I saw in the capability bitmap thread, 
and what Paul had thought the behavior was going to be.

I'm not expecting every capability to be keyed off an object class so I 
wasn't sure how to best enable them in a general way anyway.

The other concern is that some of these future capabilities might be 
policy-development-time and others may be runtime so libsemanage might 
need to be involved. I don't exactly like handling it on a case-by-case 
basis either. Any other opinions?

>> ---
>>  libsepol/src/polcaps.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  libsepol/src/polcaps.h |    8 ++++++++
>>  libsepol/src/write.c   |    3 +++
>>  3 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
>>
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ trunk/libsepol/src/polcaps.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
>> +#include <stdio.h>
>> +#include <stdlib.h>
>> +#include <errno.h>
>> +
>> +#include <sepol/policydb/policydb.h>
>> +#include "polcaps.h"
>> +
>> +int sepol_setup_capabilities(policydb_t *pol)
>> +{
>> +
>> +	if (!pol)
>> +		return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>> +
>> +	/* Each capability should be keyed in some way, 
>> +	 * such as the existance of an object class */
>> +
>> +	/* POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER */
>> +	if (hashtab_search(pol->symtab[SYM_CLASSES].table, "peer")) {
>> +		if (ebitmap_set_bit(&pol->policycaps, 
>> +				POLICY_CAPABILITY_NETPEER, 1))
>> +			return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return POLICYDB_SUCCESS;
>> +
>> +}
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ trunk/libsepol/src/polcaps.h
>> @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
>> +#ifndef _SEPOL_INTERNAL_POLCAP_H_
>> +#define _SEPOL_INTERNAL_POLCAP_H_
>> +
>> +extern int sepol_setup_capabilities(policydb_t *pol);
>> +
>> +#define POLICY_CAPABILITY_NETPEER 1
>> +
>> +#endif
>> --- trunk.orig/libsepol/src/write.c
>> +++ trunk/libsepol/src/write.c
>> @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
>>  #include "debug.h"
>>  #include "private.h"
>>  #include "mls.h"
>> +#include "polcaps.h"
>>  
>>  struct policy_data {
>>  	struct policy_file *fp;
>> @@ -1577,6 +1578,8 @@ int policydb_write(policydb_t * p, struc
>>  		return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>  
>>  	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
>> +		if (sepol_setup_capabilities(p))
>> +			return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>  		if (ebitmap_write(&p->policycaps, fp) == -1)
>>  			return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>  	}
>>
>>     



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  reply	other threads:[~2007-11-07 21:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-11-07 20:50 [patch 0/2] policy capabilities and netpeer support Joshua Brindle
2007-11-07 20:50 ` [patch 1/2] Version 22/Policy capability support Joshua Brindle
2007-11-07 20:50 ` [patch 2/2] Peersid " Joshua Brindle
2007-11-07 21:07   ` Stephen Smalley
2007-11-07 21:23     ` Joshua Brindle [this message]
2007-11-07 21:54       ` Paul Moore
2007-11-07 22:12     ` Joshua Brindle

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