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From: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
To: casey@schaufler-ca.com
Cc: akpm@osdl.org, torvalds@osdl.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] -mm (2.6.24-rc3-mm1) Smack using capabilities 32 and 33
Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2007 08:33:51 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4749A3EF.1010606@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <47490DE2.4030608@schaufler-ca.com>

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Casey Schaufler wrote:
> diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.24-rc3-mm1-base/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.24-rc3-mm1-base/include/linux/capability.h linux-2.6.24-rc3-mm1-smack/include/linux/capability.h
> --- linux-2.6.24-rc3-mm1-base/include/linux/capability.h	2007-11-22 01:51:36.000000000 -0800
> +++ linux-2.6.24-rc3-mm1-smack/include/linux/capability.h	2007-11-24 11:26:51.000000000 -0800
> @@ -314,6 +314,23 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
>  
>  #define CAP_SETFCAP	     31
>  
> +/* Override MAC access.
> +   The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
> +   An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
> +   to implement capability based overrides of that policy, this is
> +   the capability it should use to do so. */
> +
> +#define CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE     32
> +
> +/* Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
> +   The base kernel requires no MAC configuration.
> +   An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
> +   to implement capability based checks on modifications to that
> +   policy or the data required to maintain it, this is the
> +   capability it should use to do so. */
> +
> +#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN        33
> +
>  /*
>   * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
>   */
> @@ -334,7 +351,8 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
>  			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)	\
>  			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)	\
>  			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER)		\
> -			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
> +			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID) \

The following looks a bit fishy:
> +			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))

  (1<<32) & 0xffffffff == 0

I think you need to define CAP_FS_MASK_B1.

Cheers

Andrew
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  reply	other threads:[~2007-11-25 16:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-11-25  5:53 [PATCH] -mm (2.6.24-rc3-mm1) Smack using capabilities 32 and 33 Casey Schaufler
2007-11-25 16:33 ` Andrew Morgan [this message]
2007-11-25 17:13   ` Casey Schaufler
2007-11-26 16:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn

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