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From: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
To: "Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>, Caleb Case <ccase@tresys.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] user_transition support for libsepol/checkpolicy
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 09:52:00 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <47E90380.603@manicmethod.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1206450069.16113.208.camel@gorn.columbia.tresys.com>

Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On Tue, 2008-03-25 at 08:08 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>   
>> On Tue, 2008-03-25 at 07:04 -0400, Joshua Brindle wrote:
>>     
>>> Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>>       
>>>> On Mon, 2008-03-24 at 16:27 -0400, Joshua Brindle wrote:
>>>>         
>
>   
>>>>> Ah, another thing. While going through the policyrep implementation the 
>>>>> question of object_r came up. My thought is to start adding object_r 
>>>>> magic into the toolchain (adding all types, etc) and eventually purge 
>>>>> object_r from the kernel. at least one magic instance of object_r will 
>>>>> be removed by object role_transitions, the others are really short 
>>>>> circuits in the security server that can be removed after sufficient 
>>>>> support is in the toolchain. What are your thoughts on that (for future 
>>>>> reference)?
>>>>>     
>>>>>           
>>>> Well, the interesting question is what should the default role be in the
>>>> new context in security_compute_sid, if not object_r.  Even aside from
>>>> the support for per-class role transitions.  User defaults to the source
>>>> context, type defaults to the related object context, and MLS range
>>>> defaults to the low level of the source context.  Role could be the
>>>> subject's role or the related object's role.
>>>>
>>>>   
>>>>         
>>> Good question. My original assumption was that we'd use the related 
>>> object role. That would require that home directories be correctly 
>>> labeled with the role of the user. If we start using the source role 
>>> then things will quickly change from object_r to system_r, so maybe the 
>>> policy should do that anyway. Chris, any opinions on this?
>>>       
>> Yes, related object role would likely cause the least breakage.  It
>> would preserve the existing default for existing filesystems (as they
>> already have object_r in the directory contexts), while allowing us to
>> switch over to the user's role for home directories upon a relabel or
>> new filesystem.  Source role might create more conflicts, as we enforce
>> the role/type relationship for contexts and there might be a mismatch
>> between the creating process role and the parent directory type.
>>     
>
> Using the related object role seems right to me too.
>   

The inconsistency of handling parts of the context is a little troubling 
to me, half the context will be coming from the source and half from the 
object container. If this doesn't bother anyone else I suppose I'll try 
to ignore that OCD'ism of mine but I love it when the models we support 
work pretty seamlessly together and this seems like artifacts of them 
not doing that.



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  reply	other threads:[~2008-03-25 13:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-03-24 17:40 [RFC][PATCH] user_transition support for libsepol/checkpolicy Joshua Brindle
2008-03-24 20:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-24 20:27   ` Joshua Brindle
2008-03-24 20:36     ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-25 11:04       ` Joshua Brindle
2008-03-25 12:08         ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-25 13:01           ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2008-03-25 13:52             ` Joshua Brindle [this message]
2008-03-25 16:27               ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-26  8:46           ` Daniel J Walsh
2008-03-26 13:36             ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-27 19:42               ` Daniel J Walsh
2008-03-27  4:43             ` Russell Coker
2008-03-27 19:48               ` Daniel J Walsh
2008-03-24 20:30   ` Joshua Brindle
2008-03-25  4:25   ` Russell Coker
2008-03-25 10:37     ` Joshua Brindle
2008-03-25 11:42     ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-26  8:40   ` Daniel J Walsh
2008-03-26 13:33     ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-25 16:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-25 20:50   ` Joshua Brindle
2008-03-26 12:48     ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-26 13:29       ` Joshua Brindle
2008-03-26 13:41         ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-26 13:57           ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-26 14:41             ` Joshua Brindle

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