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From: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
To: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC, PATCH] fix SEM_UNDO with namespaces
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2008 18:14:47 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <47F10DF7.5010702@colorfullife.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <47F08ED6.1090103@openvz.org>

Pavel Emelyanov wrote:
> Manfred Spraul wrote:
>   
>> Hi,
>>
>> the attached patch should fix the combination of CLONE_NEWIPC with 
>> shared sysv undo structures (the common case, just 
>> sys_unshare(CLONE_NEWIPC)):
>> lookup_undo() now locates the undo array based on both semid and the 
>> namespace pointer.
>>     
>
> If you start using any IPC object and then call unshare with CLONE_NEWIPC,
> then it's your problem, but not the kernel.
>   
The result is a kernel memory corruption, and kernel memory corruptions 
are always the kernel's problem.

The code assumed that a semaphore id is globally unique. With 
namespaces,  this is not true anymore.
If two semaphore arrays exist with the same id, but different sizes, 
then semops will cause memory corruptions: The undo structure contains 
one element for each semaphore, thus the semop will write behind the end 
of the memory allocation.

> I agree, that we should probably destroy this one when the task calls 
> unshare, but trying to keep this list relevant is useless.
>   
A very tricky question: Let's assume we have a process with two threads.
The undo structure is shared, as per opengroup standard.
Now one thread calls unshare(CLONE_NEWIPC). What should happen? We 
cannot destroy the undo structure, the other thread might be still 
interested in it.
If we allow sys_unshare() for multithreaded processes with CLONE_NEWIPC 
and without CLONE_SYSVSEM, then we must handle this case.

--
    Manfred

  reply	other threads:[~2008-03-31 16:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-03-30 20:50 [RFC, PATCH] fix SEM_UNDO with namespaces Manfred Spraul
2008-03-31  7:12 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-31 16:14   ` Manfred Spraul [this message]
2008-04-01  9:44     ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-04-01 14:15       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-04-03 19:04         ` Andrew Morton
2008-04-03 19:31           ` Manfred Spraul
2008-04-01 15:25       ` Eric W. Biederman
2008-04-03 19:40         ` Manfred Spraul
2008-04-03 19:44         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-04-04  4:39           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-04-06 15:11             ` Manfred Spraul
2008-04-06 16:26               ` [PATCH] fix SEM_UNDO with namespaces, take 2 Manfred Spraul
2008-04-07  7:21                 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-04-07 17:03                   ` Manfred Spraul
2008-04-08  8:09                     ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-04-14 21:10               ` [RFC, PATCH] fix SEM_UNDO with namespaces Serge E. Hallyn

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