From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>,
"Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com>,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: Enabling policy capabilities
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2008 12:03:30 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <47FE3A52.2080702@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1207834719.21223.730.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
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Stephen Smalley wrote:
> Where do we stand on actually enabling policy capabilities in policy so
> that people can start using newer features that depend on them?
>
> I've definitely seen patches adding permissions for the peer checks, so
> is there anything preventing us from trying to enable
> network_peer_controls in policy and seeing what breaks (after Fedora 9
> at this point, I suppose - unfortunate that we didn't enable it sooner)?
>
> I haven't seen patches adding permissions for open other than just to
> define them, IIRC. So enabling open_perms would be rather bad right now
> except for unconfined domains. As a possible strategy for gradual
> roll-out of open perm, we could add open everywhere there is a read or
> write granted, enable the open_perms capability, verify no breakage, and
> then gradually remove open permission where we know it to be unneeded.
>
Open checks will be added in Fedora 10, along with turning on Xace. We
are frozen in Fedora 9. No new functionality.
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-04-10 16:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-04-10 13:38 Enabling policy capabilities Stephen Smalley
2008-04-10 14:01 ` Paul Moore
2008-04-18 14:21 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2008-04-10 16:03 ` Daniel J Walsh [this message]
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