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From: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com>
To: BVK Chaitanya <bayapuneni_chaitanya@symantec.com>
Cc: Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
Subject: Re: On x86_64 Xen Implementation
Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2008 13:17:08 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <48847034.7080506@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <488469EE.4090700@symantec.com>

BVK Chaitanya wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> Xen 3.0 inteface manual says:
> 
> On 64-bit systems it is not possible to protect the hypervisor from 
> untrusted guest code running in rings 1 and 2. Guests are therefore 
> restricted to run in ring 3 only. The guest kernel is protected from its 
> applications by context switching between the kernel and currently 
> running application.
> 
> Can anybody explain (or provide me pointers) to what x86_64 features 
> make protecting hypervisor from untrusted guest (kernels) impossible? Is 
> x86_64 (by-design) makes x86's 4 rings feature obsolete?

Somewhat. Segmentation support has been mostly dropped in x86_64 long 
mode (aka 64bit mode). By using paging you can only differentiate 
between supervisor and user mode. Separating the different rings 
requires different segment descriptors, which can hold a ring number. 
Since segmentation limits, offsets and protection flags are (mostly) 
ignored in 64bit long mode, you actually cannot use the four rings here.

Regards,
Andre.

-- 
Andre Przywara
AMD-Operating System Research Center (OSRC), Dresden, Germany
Tel: +49 351 277-84917
----to satisfy European Law for business letters:
AMD Saxony Limited Liability Company & Co. KG,
Wilschdorfer Landstr. 101, 01109 Dresden, Germany
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General Manager of AMD Saxony LLC: Dr. Hans-R. Deppe, Thomas McCoy

      reply	other threads:[~2008-07-21 11:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-07-21 10:50 On x86_64 Xen Implementation BVK Chaitanya
2008-07-21 11:17 ` Andre Przywara [this message]

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