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From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] file capabilities: remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2008 21:25:35 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <48DDB5BF.2030006@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <89d3843fc1aaf91ded89d741b2e6d425508e0146.1222451103.git.serue@us.ibm.com>

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Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> From: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
> 
> Remove the option to compile the kernel without file capabilities.  Not
> compiling file capabilities actually makes the kernel less safe, as it
> includes the possibility for a task changing another task's capabilities.
> 
> Some are concerned that userspace tools (and user education) are not
> up to the task of properly configuring file capabilities on a system.
> For those cases, there is now the ability to boot with the no_file_caps
> boot option.  This will prevent file capabilities from being used in
> the capabilities recalculation at exec, but will not change the rest
> of the kernel behavior which used to be switchable using the
> CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES option.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>

> ---
>  fs/open.c                  |    8 --
>  include/linux/capability.h |    2 -
>  include/linux/init_task.h  |    4 -
>  kernel/capability.c        |  158 --------------------------------------------
>  security/Kconfig           |    9 ---
>  security/commoncap.c       |   53 ---------------
>  6 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 234 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> index 07da935..6e1cd6e 100644
[...snip...]

Cheers

Andrew
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  reply	other threads:[~2008-09-27  4:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-09-27  2:27 [PATCH 0/6] file capabilities cleanups: introduction Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27 ` [PATCH 1/6] file capabilities: add no_file_caps switch (v3) Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27   ` [PATCH 2/6] file capabilities: remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  4:25     ` Andrew G. Morgan [this message]
2008-09-27  2:27   ` [PATCH 3/6] file capabilities: uninline cap_safe_nice Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  4:26     ` Andrew G. Morgan
2008-09-27  5:27       ` James Morris
2008-09-27  2:27   ` [PATCH 4/6] file capabilities: clean up setcap code Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  4:58     ` Andrew G. Morgan
2008-09-27 13:43       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27   ` [PATCH 5/6] file capabilities: remove needless inline functions Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  4:39     ` Andrew G. Morgan
2008-09-27 13:40       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-29 21:53         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27   ` [PATCH 6/6] file capabilities: remove needless (?) bprm_clear_caps calls Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27       ` Serge E. Hallyn

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