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From: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
To: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: Capabilities audit field
Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2008 19:18:10 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <48F285B2.90008@manicmethod.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200810120907.07511.sgrubb@redhat.com>

Steve Grubb wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I recenetly found out that the kernel now allows more than 32 capabilities. 
> This means I need to update the audit code that inteprets this value given 
> from SE Linux. When I looked over the 2.6.27 kernel code, I found that SE 
> Linux has not updated the capabilities code. Its still being kept as a simple 
> integer in avc.h, but everywhere else I look in the kernel has moved to 
> kernel_cap_t, which is an array. Are patches for moving to kernel_cap_t 
> scheduled for 2.6.28? Are there security implications for not being able to 
> access or control capabilities > 32?
>   

SELinux added an additional object class (capability2) so as to not 
extend the access vector.

The current object class looks like this:
class capability2
{
        mac_override    # unused by SELinux
        mac_admin       # unused by SELinux
}

We can control them but they should never be hit on an SELinux system 
anyway (IIUC)



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  parent reply	other threads:[~2008-10-12 23:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-10-12 13:07 Capabilities audit field Steve Grubb
2008-10-12 23:12 ` James Morris
2008-10-13 10:35   ` Steve Grubb
2008-10-13 22:54     ` James Morris
2008-10-13 23:27       ` Steve Grubb
2008-10-14  9:21         ` James Morris
2008-10-14 13:35     ` Stephen Smalley
2008-10-12 23:18 ` Joshua Brindle [this message]
2008-10-13  4:05   ` James Morris

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