From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mummy.ncsc.mil (mummy.ncsc.mil [144.51.88.129]) by tarius.tycho.ncsc.mil (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id n0GDueUP009235 for ; Fri, 16 Jan 2009 08:56:40 -0500 Received: from exchange.columbia.tresys.com (jazzhorn.ncsc.mil [144.51.5.9]) by mummy.ncsc.mil (8.12.10/8.12.10) with SMTP id n0GDudTM016461 for ; Fri, 16 Jan 2009 13:56:39 GMT Message-ID: <497091FF.40500@manicmethod.com> Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 08:56:15 -0500 From: Joshua Brindle MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Justin P. Mattock" CC: Amon Ott , SE-Linux Subject: Re: Announce: RSBAC 1.4.0 released References: <200901160948.32172.ao@rsbac.org> <49705322.8010309@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <49705322.8010309@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Justin P. Mattock wrote: > Amon Ott wrote: >> Rule Set Based Access Control (RSBAC) 1.4.0 has been released for both >> Linux kernels 2.4.37 and 2.6.27.10 >> You can download the new version from http://www.rsbac.org >> >> RSBAC is one of the leading access control systems for the Linux >> kernel with a good selection of access control models, see >> http://www.rsbac.org/why for more details. >> >> Important changes since 1.3 series: >> >> * VUM (Virtual User Management) support >> (http://rsbac.org/redir.php?t=vum) >> * One time password support for user management >> (http://rsbac.org/redir.php?t=otp) >> * Code for kernels 2.4 and 2.6 has been separated. 2.4 kernels might >> be phased out at a later date. >> * PAM module does not send a message "User not authenticated" anymore >> if authentication failed. (To match other PAM modules behavior) >> * Made PAM password prompt standard and definable to RSBAC's custom >> prompt if the user wants it only. >> * rsbac_useradd -K to copy a user with password. >> * rsbac_mount now uses kernel's vfs_mount >> >> >> About RSBAC 1.4: >> --- >> >> RSBAC 1.4 mainly introduces the new Virtual User Management feature ( >> (http://rsbac.org/redir.php?t=vum), >> which allows to isolate complete sets of users in so-called "virtual >> sets". Every user in every set can have individual passwords and >> access rights. >> >> As an example, you can start your mail server in a different set, and >> the users getting the email will not be part of the system users. >> >> Likewise, your jails can be started in a different set, so that the >> users in that jail will never be the same ones as the real system users. >> >> You can specify the user set with the usual tools by specifying the >> full user path, e.g.: >> >> 0/0 defines user id 0 (root) in virtual set 0 (eg system user root) >> 0/1000 defines user id 1000 in virtual set 0 (eg a system user) >> 1/secoff defines user secoff in virtual set 1 ( be.g. with uid 400) >> 2/1000 defines user id 1000 in virtual set 2 (for example, mail users >> could be in set 2) >> >> Amon. >> > alright a new security mechanism!! RSBAC has been around quite some time actually. It is not SELinux related and does not use LSM to place its security hooks and therefore is not viable for the upstream kernel. It is an addon kernel patch. > (still need to learn UBAC though); UBAC is an SELinux policy, in some ways it demonstrates the flexibility of the SELinux policy language. RSBAC is a framework for many security modules (sort of like a heavier-weight LSM). Currently it doesn't have a module with as expressive a policy language as SELinux. The only MAC module is a Bell and LaPadula implementation (though it does have role based access control, access control lists and others). > Anyways I'll have to give this a shot. > -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.