Joshua Brindle wrote:

Andy Warner wrote:

KaiGai Kohei wrote:

As I noted in the previous message, SE-PostgreSQL is postponed to
the PostgreSQL v8.5 after the long discussion in the pgsql-hackers
list, unfortunately.
However, it also mean a good chance to revise its design because
we have a few months before v8.5 development cycle launched.

1. Changes in object classes and access vectors
 - add db_database:{superuser} permission
  
 - remove db_database:{get_param set_param} permission
 - remove db_table/db_column/db_tuple:{use} permission

  Please refer the previous messages for them.

 - add new object class "db_schema"
  As Andy noted, we directly put database objects under the
  db_database class directly. But, some of database objects
  are created under a schema object.
  In other word, RDBMS's design has three level hierachy as:
     <database>  (<-- some DBMSs calls it as <catalog>)
      + <schema>
         + <tables>, <procedures>, ...

  Now, we control user's DDL statement via permissions on
  the sepgsql_sysobj_t type as row-level controls.
  But I think db_schema object class here is meaningful
  to match SQL's design and analogy to the dir class.

  The new db_schema object class inherits six permissions
  from common database objects, and defines three its own
  permissions: add_object, remove_object, usage

I would suggest that the SQL catalog object should also be supported. 
Though not common in implementation, it is part of the SQL spec. Our 
DBMS (Trusted RUBIX) supports it, and for us it is basically another 
level in the naming. (database.catalog.schema.table). I would suggest 
that a db_catalog object be included with the same basic semantics as 
the db_schema object.


Is there more information available about how Trusted RUBIX uses SELinux? I see
on the webpage a brief mention of it but no detailed page like the other access
control models, nor in the security policy manager data sheet.

On our download page (http://rubix.com/cms/downloads) there is a pdf called the Trusted RUBIX SELinux Guide.
Because our SELinux integration is very new we have not updated our website to reflect it yet. The above Guide is the best source of how we use SELinux. I can also answer any questions you have.

In general, I created a concept called an "object set" which may be created with SELinux interfaces. An object set is all DBMS objects under (and including) a named catalog object. An object set may include any number of schemata, tables, views, etc. An admin may create an object set and roles to administer the object set. They may also use provided interfaces to give a domain restricted SQL access to the access set (e.g., full sql, select only, insert, update, DDL, etc.). The intent was to partition security domains by database subtree and provide easy interfaces for them to create roles and control SQL access.

Our Security Policy Manager is a totally separate Attribute Based Access Control policy mechanism, based upon XACML. It does interact with SELinux a little but in general is orthogonal. The ABAC decisions may optionally override SELinux or work to further refine the SELinux policy decision. The SPM may also consult about an SELinux policy decision and use it in its policy decision.

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