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From: Oren Laadan <orenl@cs.columbia.edu>
To: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	Linux Containers <containers@lists.osdl.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/9] cr: capabilities: define checkpoint and restore fns
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2009 20:05:35 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4A25BE4F.6000603@cs.columbia.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <551280e50906020849o12f777dma4fd66d0dd887e38@mail.gmail.com>



Andrew G. Morgan wrote:
> [I'm sorry if I'm flogging a dead horse. I'm actually really excited
> by this functionality! :-) ]
> 
> Comments inline...
> 
> On Tue, Jun 2, 2009 at 7:23 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:
>> Quoting Andrew G. Morgan (morgan@kernel.org):
>>> On Mon, Jun 1, 2009 at 3:18 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:
>>>> Quoting Andrew G. Morgan (morgan@kernel.org):
>>>>> On Mon, Jun 1, 2009 at 6:35 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>> I'll put in a commented BUILD_BUG_ON like Alexey suggests - does that
>>>>>>>> suffice?
>>>>> I can't speak for other subsystems, but it seems to me as if for the
>>>>> capabilities, I'd want to create something like this in
>>>>> include/linux/capabilities.h
>>>>>
>>>>> typedef struct checkpoint_caps_s {
>>>>>    /* what goes in here is the capability code's business */
>>>>> } checkpoint_caps_t;
>>>> Sigh - Did a patch this way, but the problem is userspace needs to be
>>>> able to parse the checkpoint image, so it needs to know what this struct
>>>> looks like.  So if I put it the struct definition
>>>> include/linux/capability.h, I run into a whole new set of problems
>>>> trying to compile a userspace program to do a sys_restart().
>>> Does the user space app need to be able to modify the data in some
>>> way? It seems like embedding a length with the structure or something
>>> might simplify such a user space dependency.
>> Hmm, I suppose I could do something like define struct ckpt_capabilities
>> in capabilities.h, then in checkpoint_hdr.h do
>>
>> struct ckpt_capabilities;
>> struct ckpt_cap_dummy {
>>        __u64 dummies[9];
>> };
>>
>> struct ckpt_hdr_cred {
>>        ...
>>        union {
>>                struct ckpt_capabilities r;
>>                struct ckpt_cap_dummy d;
>>        } caps;
>> };
> 
> Yes, something like this, but perhaps:
> 
>     struct ckpt_caps_part_s {
>        int length; /* = sizeof(struct ckpt_capabilities) */
>        cap_ckpt_t data;
>     } caps;
> 
> and then the generic checkpoint code would do:
> 
>    #include <linux/capabilities.h>
>    caps.ckpt_capabilities_length = cap_checkpoint_save(&caps.data);
>    [...]
>    cap_checkpoint_restore(caps.length, &caps.caps.data);
> 
> and the capability code could opaquely deal with the details.
> 
> The reason I think this is more maintainable is that its clear (to the
> capability code) what is being check-pointed and, conversely, for the
> checkpoint code it is abstracted with the responsibility for detailed
> state decisions elsewhere in the kernel.
> 
> I suspect I don't understand the user space code issue sufficiently.
> But if, for some reason, the user space source code is unable to
> include the definition of cap_ckpt_t, it should be clear that parsing
> this type of data structure, given that offsets are embedded in it,
> should be straightforward.
> 

As I said here:
https://lists.linux-foundation.org/pipermail/containers/2009-June/018288.html

Userspace needs to understand what's in the image to be able to
provide debug/info about the image, and to be able to convert
images from older kernel version to newer (or even vice versa if
one insists).

Oren.

>> with a BUILD_BUG_ON to ensure that sizeof(r)==sizeof(d).  Ugly, but
>> should suit everyone?
> 
> could the checkpointing code check the return value for
> cap_checkpoint_restore() and fail the restore if it returned an error?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Andrew
> 
>>>> So I went part-way to what you suggested in the patchset I'm about to
>>>> send out (please see patch 6/8).  I think the caps code does look
>>>> nicer in this new version.
>>> Better, but I remain concerned that the code looks hard to maintain
>>> when structured this way.
>> Why exactly?  Just having the struct defined in checkpoint_hdr.h?  Or
>> is there something else I'm unwittingly doing?
>>
>> thanks,
>> -serge
>> --
>> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
>> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
>> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>>
> 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2009-06-03  0:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-05-29 22:32 [PATCH 0/9] credentials c/r: Introduction Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-29 22:32 ` [PATCH 1/9] cred: #include init.h in cred.h Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-29 22:32 ` [PATCH 2/9] groups: move code to kernel/groups.c Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-29 22:33 ` [PATCH 3/9] cr: break out new_user_ns() Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-29 22:33 ` [PATCH 4/9] cr: split core function out of some set*{u,g}id functions Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-29 22:33 ` [PATCH 5/9] cr: capabilities: define checkpoint and restore fns Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-31 20:26   ` Andrew G. Morgan
2009-05-31 20:56     ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-06-01  1:38     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-01  2:18       ` Andrew G. Morgan
2009-06-01 13:35         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-01 15:46           ` Andrew G. Morgan
2009-06-01 22:18             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-02 13:49               ` Andrew G. Morgan
2009-06-02 14:23                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-02 15:26                   ` Oren Laadan
2009-06-02 15:49                   ` Andrew G. Morgan
2009-06-02 17:15                     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-03  0:05                     ` Oren Laadan [this message]
     [not found]                       ` <4A25BE4F.6000603-eQaUEPhvms7ENvBUuze7eA@public.gmane.org>
2009-06-03 15:03                         ` Andrew G. Morgan
2009-06-03 16:45                           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-04 14:13                             ` Andrew G. Morgan
2009-06-05 19:41                               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-06 15:02                                 ` Andrew G. Morgan
2009-06-15  9:58                                   ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-06-01 15:49     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-01 16:34       ` Oren Laadan
2009-05-29 22:33 ` [PATCH 6/9] cr: checkpoint and restore task credentials Serge E. Hallyn
     [not found] ` <20090529223229.GA14536-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2009-05-29 22:33   ` [PATCH 7/9] cr: restore file->f_cred Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-29 22:33   ` [PATCH 8/9] user namespaces: debug refcounts Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-31 18:51     ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-06-01 19:02       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-29 22:34 ` [PATCH 9/9] cr: ipc: reset kern_ipc_perms Serge E. Hallyn

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