From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Avi Kivity Subject: Re: vhost-net todo list Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2009 20:13:03 +0300 Message-ID: <4AB11C9F.8020001@redhat.com> References: <20090916100438.GA30036@redhat.com> <200909161708.46412.arnd@arndb.de> <20090916151922.GD5513@redhat.com> <200909161727.26153.arnd@arndb.de> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" , anthony@codemonkey.ws, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Rusty Russell To: Arnd Bergmann Return-path: Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:1394 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753999AbZIPRNO (ORCPT ); Wed, 16 Sep 2009 13:13:14 -0400 In-Reply-To: <200909161727.26153.arnd@arndb.de> Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On 09/16/2009 06:27 PM, Arnd Bergmann wrote: > That scenario is probably not so relevant for KVM, unless you > consider the guest taking over the qemu host process a valid > security threat. > It is. We address it by using SCM_RIGHTS for all sensitive operations and selinuxing qemu as tightly as possible. -- I have a truly marvellous patch that fixes the bug which this signature is too narrow to contain.