[PATCH] libselinux: raw string_to_class/string_to_av_perm variants

[PATCH] libselinux: raw string_to_class/string_to_av_perm variants

[Eamon Walsh]

This is the first patch in a series to add dynamic class and permission 
remapping support.  The kernel has recently gained support for such 
remapping, where the class and permission values exposed in 
/selinux/class may change on policy reload.  Hence libselinux must do 
its own remapping in response to policy reloads.

This patch adds internal "raw" variants of string_to_security_class() 
and string_to_av_perm().  These are used by the mapping code when 
setting up a new mapping.

Signed-off-by: Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
---

  mapping.h   |   11 +++++++++++
  stringrep.c |   21 +++++++++++++++------
  2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)


diff --git a/libselinux/src/mapping.h b/libselinux/src/mapping.h
index b96756b..b9e9c44 100644
--- a/libselinux/src/mapping.h
+++ b/libselinux/src/mapping.h
@@ -7,6 +7,17 @@
  #define _SELINUX_MAPPING_H_

  #include<selinux/selinux.h>
+#include "dso.h"
+
+/*
+ * Raw stringrep functions
+ */
+
+extern security_class_t
+string_to_security_class_raw(const char *s) hidden;
+
+extern access_vector_t
+string_to_av_perm_raw(security_class_t kclass, const char *s) hidden;

  /*
   * Get real, kernel values from mapped values
diff --git a/libselinux/src/stringrep.c b/libselinux/src/stringrep.c
index b19bce7..c82d07a 100644
--- a/libselinux/src/stringrep.c
+++ b/libselinux/src/stringrep.c
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static const char *security_av_perm_to_string_compat(security_class_t tclass,
  	return NULL;
  }

-security_class_t string_to_security_class(const char *s)
+security_class_t string_to_security_class_raw(const char *s)
  {
  	struct discover_class_node *node;

@@ -453,31 +453,40 @@ security_class_t string_to_security_class(const char *s)
  		}
  	}

-	return map_class(node->value);
+	return node->value;
  }

-access_vector_t string_to_av_perm(security_class_t tclass, const char *s)
+security_class_t string_to_security_class(const char *s)
+{
+	return map_class(string_to_security_class_raw(s));
+}
+
+access_vector_t string_to_av_perm_raw(security_class_t kclass, const char *s)
  {
  	struct discover_class_node *node;
-	security_class_t kclass = unmap_class(tclass);

  	__selinux_once(once, init_obj_class_compat);

  	if (obj_class_compat)
-		return map_perm(tclass, string_to_av_perm_compat(kclass, s));
+		return string_to_av_perm_compat(kclass, s);

  	node = get_class_cache_entry_value(kclass);
  	if (node != NULL) {
  		size_t i;
  		for (i=0; i<MAXVECTORS&&  node->perms[i] != NULL; i++)
  			if (strcmp(node->perms[i],s) == 0)
-				return map_perm(tclass, 1<<i);
+				return 1<<i;
  	}

  	errno = EINVAL;
  	return 0;
  }

+access_vector_t string_to_av_perm(security_class_t tclass, const char *s)
+{
+	return map_perm(tclass, string_to_av_perm_raw(map_class(tclass), s));
+}
+
  const char *security_class_to_string(security_class_t tclass)
  {
  	struct discover_class_node *node;


-- 
Eamon Walsh<ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
National Security Agency


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Re: [PATCH] libselinux: raw string_to_class/string_to_av_perm variants

[Eamon Walsh]

This patch adds support for remapping classes and permissions on policy 
reload.  This is accomplished by separating the code that computes the 
"real" kernel class and permission values into a helper function, 
mapping_compute().  This function is called both from 
selinux_set_mapping() when the user specifies a new mapping, and from 
the netlink code when a policyload notification is received.  The 
function now builds up a temporary mapping and swaps it in rather than 
working on the active mapping in place.

Issue: There is a race condition in which old class and permission 
values may arrive from userspace after a kernel policyload has taken 
place.  Fixing this would require a string interface to the kernel, or 
some kind of transaction support.

Signed-off-by: Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
---

  avc_internal.c |   17 +++++++
  mapping.c      |  130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
  mapping.h      |   10 ++++
  3 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)


diff --git a/libselinux/src/avc_internal.c b/libselinux/src/avc_internal.c
index 8372f52..2c54a92 100644
--- a/libselinux/src/avc_internal.c
+++ b/libselinux/src/avc_internal.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
  #include "callbacks.h"
  #include "selinux_netlink.h"
  #include "avc_internal.h"
+#include "mapping.h"

  #ifndef NETLINK_SELINUX
  #define NETLINK_SELINUX 7
@@ -180,6 +181,8 @@ static int avc_netlink_process(char *buf)
  		avc_log(SELINUX_INFO,
  			"%s:  received policyload notice (seqno=%d)\n",
  			avc_prefix, msg->seqno);
+
+		/* Flush the AVC */
  		rc = avc_ss_reset(msg->seqno);
  		if (rc<  0) {
  			avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR,
@@ -187,6 +190,20 @@ static int avc_netlink_process(char *buf)
  				avc_prefix, rc, errno);
  			return rc;
  		}
+
+		/* Flush any cached class/permission values */
+		flush_class_cache();
+
+		/* Recompute any mapped classes/permissions */
+		rc = mapping_recompute();
+		if (rc<  0) {
+			avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR,
+				"%s:  mapping reset returned %d (errno %d)\n",
+				avc_prefix, rc, errno);
+			return rc;
+		}
+
+		/* Call callback for users */
  		rc = selinux_netlink_policyload(msg->seqno);
  		if (rc<  0)
  			return rc;
diff --git a/libselinux/src/mapping.c b/libselinux/src/mapping.c
index f9858ce..eb99eb3 100644
--- a/libselinux/src/mapping.c
+++ b/libselinux/src/mapping.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
  #include<stdio.h>
  #include<stdlib.h>
  #include<stdarg.h>
+#include<string.h>
  #include<assert.h>
  #include<selinux/selinux.h>
  #include<selinux/avc.h>
@@ -17,12 +18,85 @@

  struct selinux_mapping {
  	security_class_t value; /* real, kernel value */
+	char *name;
  	unsigned num_perms;
  	access_vector_t perms[sizeof(access_vector_t) * 8];
+	char *names[sizeof(access_vector_t) * 8];
  };

-static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping = NULL;
-static security_class_t current_mapping_size = 0;
+static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
+static int current_mapping_size;
+
+/*
+ * Mapping recompute functions
+ */
+
+static void
+mapping_free(struct selinux_mapping *map, int size, int free_strings)
+{
+	int i;
+	unsigned j;
+
+	if (free_strings)
+		for (i = 0; i<  size; i++) {
+			free(map[i].name);
+			for (j = 0; j<  map[i].num_perms; j++)
+				free(map[i].names[j]);
+		}
+
+	free(map);
+}
+
+static int
+mapping_compute(struct selinux_mapping *map, int size, int free_strings)
+{
+	struct selinux_mapping *old_mapping;
+	int old_mapping_size, i;
+	unsigned k;
+
+	/* Find the real, kernel values for the names */
+	for (i = 1; i<  size; i++) {
+		map[i].value = string_to_security_class_raw(map[i].name);
+		if (!map[i].value)
+			return -1;
+
+		for (k = 0; k<  map[i].num_perms; k++) {
+			if (!map[i].names[k])
+				continue;
+			map[i].perms[k] = string_to_av_perm_raw(
+				map[i].value, map[i].names[k]);
+			if (!map[i].perms[k])
+				return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Switch in the new mapping */
+	old_mapping_size = current_mapping_size;
+	old_mapping = current_mapping;
+	current_mapping_size = size;
+	current_mapping = map;
+	mapping_free(old_mapping, old_mapping_size, free_strings);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mapping_recompute(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_mapping *copy;
+	size_t size;
+
+	size = current_mapping_size * sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
+	if (size == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Not a deep copy - we keep the old class and perm names */
+	copy = malloc(size);
+	if (!copy)
+		return -1;
+	memcpy(copy, current_mapping, size);
+
+	return mapping_compute(copy, current_mapping_size, 0);
+}

  /*
   * Mapping setting function
@@ -31,40 +105,34 @@ static security_class_t current_mapping_size = 0;
  int
  selinux_set_mapping(struct security_class_mapping *map)
  {
-	size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
-	security_class_t i, j;
+	struct selinux_mapping *new_mapping;
+	int new_size, i, j;
  	unsigned k;

-	free(current_mapping);
-	current_mapping = NULL;
-	current_mapping_size = 0;
-
-	if (avc_reset()<  0)
-		goto err;
-
  	/* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
  	if (!map) {
  		errno = EINVAL;
-		goto err;
+		return -1;
  	}
  	i = 0;
  	while (map[i].name)
  		i++;

  	/* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
-	current_mapping = (struct selinux_mapping *)calloc(++i, size);
-	if (!current_mapping)
-		goto err;
+	new_size = i + 1;
+	new_mapping = calloc(new_size, sizeof(struct selinux_mapping));
+	if (!new_mapping)
+		return -1;

-	/* Store the raw class and permission values */
+	/* Store the class and permission names */
  	j = 0;
  	while (map[j].name) {
  		struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
-		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = current_mapping + j;
+		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = new_mapping + j;

-		p_out->value = string_to_security_class(p_in->name);
-		if (!p_out->value)
-			goto err2;
+		p_out->name = strdup(p_in->name);
+		if (!p_out->name)
+			goto err;

  		k = 0;
  		while (p_in->perms&&  p_in->perms[k]) {
@@ -73,23 +141,23 @@ selinux_set_mapping(struct security_class_mapping *map)
  				k++;
  				continue;
  			}
-			p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(p_out->value,
-							    p_in->perms[k]);
-			if (!p_out->perms[k])
-				goto err2;
+			p_out->names[k] = strdup(p_in->perms[k]);
+			if (!p_out->names[k])
+				goto err;
  			k++;
  		}
  		p_out->num_perms = k;
  	}

-	/* Set the mapping size here so the above lookups are "raw" */
-	current_mapping_size = i;
-	return 0;
-err2:
-	free(current_mapping);
-	current_mapping = NULL;
-	current_mapping_size = 0;
+	/* Flush the AVC */
+	if (avc_reset()<  0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Set up the mapping */
+	if (mapping_compute(new_mapping, new_size, 1) == 0)
+		return 0;
  err:
+	mapping_free(new_mapping, new_size, 1);
  	return -1;
  }

diff --git a/libselinux/src/mapping.h b/libselinux/src/mapping.h
index b9e9c44..34d94eb 100644
--- a/libselinux/src/mapping.h
+++ b/libselinux/src/mapping.h
@@ -42,6 +42,16 @@ map_perm(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t kperm);
  extern void
  map_decision(security_class_t tclass, struct av_decision *avd);

+/*
+ * Recompute mapping on policy load
+ */
+
+extern void
+flush_class_cache(void) hidden;
+
+extern int
+mapping_recompute(void) hidden;
+
  /*mapping is not used for embedded build*/
  #ifdef DISABLE_AVC
  #define unmap_perm(x,y) y



-- 
Eamon Walsh<ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
National Security Agency


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Re: [PATCH] libselinux: raw string_to_class/string_to_av_perm variants

[Stephen Smalley]

On Wed, 2009-10-07 at 15:12 -0400, Eamon Walsh wrote:
> This is the first patch in a series to add dynamic class and permission 
> remapping support.  The kernel has recently gained support for such 
> remapping, where the class and permission values exposed in 
> /selinux/class may change on policy reload.  Hence libselinux must do 
> its own remapping in response to policy reloads.
> 
> This patch adds internal "raw" variants of string_to_security_class() 
> and string_to_av_perm().  These are used by the mapping code when 
> setting up a new mapping.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
> ---
> 
>   mapping.h   |   11 +++++++++++
>   stringrep.c |   21 +++++++++++++++------
>   2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> 

> diff --git a/libselinux/src/stringrep.c b/libselinux/src/stringrep.c
> index b19bce7..c82d07a 100644
> --- a/libselinux/src/stringrep.c
> +++ b/libselinux/src/stringrep.c
> @@ -453,31 +453,40 @@ security_class_t string_to_security_class(const char *s)
<snip>
> +access_vector_t string_to_av_perm_raw(security_class_t kclass, const char *s)
>   {
>   	struct discover_class_node *node;
> -	security_class_t kclass = unmap_class(tclass);
>   	__selinux_once(once, init_obj_class_compat);
> 
>   	if (obj_class_compat)
> -		return map_perm(tclass, string_to_av_perm_compat(kclass, s));
> +		return string_to_av_perm_compat(kclass, s);
> 
>   	node = get_class_cache_entry_value(kclass);
>   	if (node != NULL) {
>   		size_t i;
>   		for (i=0; i<MAXVECTORS&&  node->perms[i] != NULL; i++)
>   			if (strcmp(node->perms[i],s) == 0)
> -				return map_perm(tclass, 1<<i);
> +				return 1<<i;
>   	}
> 
>   	errno = EINVAL;
>   	return 0;
>   }
> 
> +access_vector_t string_to_av_perm(security_class_t tclass, const char *s)
> +{
> +	return map_perm(tclass, string_to_av_perm_raw(map_class(tclass), s));
> +}
> +

Shouldn't this be unmap_class(tclass)?

BTW, speaking of it in terms of kernel vs mapped values is confusing,
especially now that the kernel itself is performing mapping.  The actual
distinction is policy values (unmapped) vs. object manager (mapped)
values.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Re: [PATCH] libselinux: raw string_to_class/string_to_av_perm variants

[Stephen Smalley]

On Wed, 2009-10-07 at 15:50 -0400, Eamon Walsh wrote:
> This patch adds support for remapping classes and permissions on policy 
> reload.  This is accomplished by separating the code that computes the 
> "real" kernel class and permission values into a helper function, 
> mapping_compute().  This function is called both from 
> selinux_set_mapping() when the user specifies a new mapping, and from 
> the netlink code when a policyload notification is received.  The 
> function now builds up a temporary mapping and swaps it in rather than 
> working on the active mapping in place.
> 
> Issue: There is a race condition in which old class and permission 
> values may arrive from userspace after a kernel policyload has taken 
> place.  Fixing this would require a string interface to the kernel, or 
> some kind of transaction support.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
> ---
> 
>   avc_internal.c |   17 +++++++
>   mapping.c      |  130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
>   mapping.h      |   10 ++++
>   3 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
> 
> 

> diff --git a/libselinux/src/mapping.c b/libselinux/src/mapping.c
> index f9858ce..eb99eb3 100644
> --- a/libselinux/src/mapping.c
> +++ b/libselinux/src/mapping.c
<snip>
> +static int
> +mapping_compute(struct selinux_mapping *map, int size, int free_strings)
> +{
> +	struct selinux_mapping *old_mapping;
> +	int old_mapping_size, i;
> +	unsigned k;
> +
> +	/* Find the real, kernel values for the names */
> +	for (i = 1; i<  size; i++) {
> +		map[i].value = string_to_security_class_raw(map[i].name);
> +		if (!map[i].value)
> +			return -1;
> +
> +		for (k = 0; k<  map[i].num_perms; k++) {
> +			if (!map[i].names[k])
> +				continue;
> +			map[i].perms[k] = string_to_av_perm_raw(
> +				map[i].value, map[i].names[k]);
> +			if (!map[i].perms[k])
> +				return -1;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Switch in the new mapping */
> +	old_mapping_size = current_mapping_size;
> +	old_mapping = current_mapping;
> +	current_mapping_size = size;
> +	current_mapping = map;
> +	mapping_free(old_mapping, old_mapping_size, free_strings);

I don't think this is quite safe.  Other threads might see new value of
current_mapping_size while still having old value of current_mapping, or
might dereference the old current_mapping value after it has been freed.
In the kernel security server, we have the policy rdlock guarding reads
to it and the policy wrlock guarding the switching of the two values.

If you moved the call to this function inside of avc_ss_reset() after
taking the avc lock, then that would exclude interleaving calls to
security_compute_av() via avc_has_perm(), although not direct calls to
it.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Re: [PATCH] libselinux: raw string_to_class/string_to_av_perm variants

[Stephen Smalley]

On Wed, 2009-10-07 at 15:50 -0400, Eamon Walsh wrote:
> This patch adds support for remapping classes and permissions on policy 
> reload.  This is accomplished by separating the code that computes the 
> "real" kernel class and permission values into a helper function, 
> mapping_compute().  This function is called both from 
> selinux_set_mapping() when the user specifies a new mapping, and from 
> the netlink code when a policyload notification is received.  The 
> function now builds up a temporary mapping and swaps it in rather than 
> working on the active mapping in place.
> 
> Issue: There is a race condition in which old class and permission 
> values may arrive from userspace after a kernel policyload has taken 
> place.  Fixing this would require a string interface to the kernel, or 
> some kind of transaction support.

Also, in addition to these changes, you'll want to grab the
security_deny_unknown() value at startup and upon policy reloads and use
it inside of map_decision() for unknown permissions and inside of
security_compute_av_flags_raw() for unknown classes just as in the
kernel for map_decision() and security_compute_av().  And possibly
mapping_compute() should log unknown classes/permissions and their
disposition (allow or deny) in the same manner as the kernel's
selinux_set_mapping().

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Re: [PATCH] libselinux: raw string_to_class/string_to_av_perm variants

[Eamon Walsh]

On 10/08/2009 08:30 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Wed, 2009-10-07 at 15:50 -0400, Eamon Walsh wrote:
>    
>> This patch adds support for remapping classes and permissions on policy
>> reload.  This is accomplished by separating the code that computes the
>> "real" kernel class and permission values into a helper function,
>> mapping_compute().  This function is called both from
>> selinux_set_mapping() when the user specifies a new mapping, and from
>> the netlink code when a policyload notification is received.  The
>> function now builds up a temporary mapping and swaps it in rather than
>> working on the active mapping in place.
>>
>> Issue: There is a race condition in which old class and permission
>> values may arrive from userspace after a kernel policyload has taken
>> place.  Fixing this would require a string interface to the kernel, or
>> some kind of transaction support.
>>      
> Also, in addition to these changes, you'll want to grab the
> security_deny_unknown() value at startup and upon policy reloads and use
> it inside of map_decision() for unknown permissions and inside of
> security_compute_av_flags_raw() for unknown classes just as in the
> kernel for map_decision() and security_compute_av().  And possibly
> mapping_compute() should log unknown classes/permissions and their
> disposition (allow or deny) in the same manner as the kernel's
> selinux_set_mapping().
>    


Yup, those are the next patches coming, after I manage to free up some 
time to work on them.

-- 
Eamon Walsh<ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
National Security Agency


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