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From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>,
	Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>,
	Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>,
	Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>,
	Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] [x86] detect and report lack of NX protections
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 12:25:39 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4AF9CC43.50103@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20091110194304.GW5129@outflux.net>

The more I stare at the underlying code, the more I'm convinced that the
fundamental problem is that the underlying code is insane, with multiple
levels of detection for what amounts to cpu_has_nx, each effectively
checking what the previous code has done.

check_efer(), for example, screws with EFER, but EFER is simply set in
head_64.S from CPUID (unless Xen does something insane -- but if so, Xen
should clear X86_FEATURE_NX instead.)

The 32-bit startup code also sets NX, but yet on 32 bits we wiggle EFER
as if it had never been.  This code is screaming for cleanup and
unification.

	-hpa


  parent reply	other threads:[~2009-11-10 20:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-10-19 18:42 [PATCH] [x86] detect and report lack of NX protections Kees Cook
2009-10-19 23:43 ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-10-20  2:04   ` [PATCH v2] " Kees Cook
2009-10-20  2:18     ` H. Peter Anvin
2009-10-20  4:44       ` Kees Cook
2009-10-20  4:55       ` [PATCH v3] " Kees Cook
2009-11-09 22:10         ` [PATCH v4] " Kees Cook
2009-11-09 23:16           ` H. Peter Anvin
2009-11-10 15:49             ` Kees Cook
2009-11-10 16:47               ` H. Peter Anvin
2009-11-10 16:57                 ` Kees Cook
2009-11-10 17:12                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2009-11-10 17:46                     ` Kees Cook
2009-11-10 18:53                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2009-11-10 19:43                         ` Kees Cook
2009-11-10 19:59                           ` H. Peter Anvin
2009-11-10 20:55                             ` Kees Cook
2009-11-10 21:22                               ` H. Peter Anvin
2009-11-10 22:15                                 ` Kees Cook
2009-11-10 22:25                                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2009-11-12 18:01                               ` Yuhong Bao
2009-11-10 20:25                           ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2009-11-10 16:55           ` [PATCH v5] " Kees Cook

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