Re: DDoS attack causing bad effect on conntrack searches

[Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>]

Eric Dumazet wrote:
> Le jeudi 22 avril 2010 à 22:38 +0200, Jesper Dangaard Brouer a écrit :
>> On Thu, 22 Apr 2010, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>
>>> Le jeudi 22 avril 2010 à 08:51 -0700, Paul E. McKenney a écrit :
>>>> On Thu, Apr 22, 2010 at 04:53:49PM +0200, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>>>> Le jeudi 22 avril 2010 à 16:36 +0200, Eric Dumazet a écrit :
>>>>>
>>>>> If we can do the 'retry' a 10 times, it means the attacker was really
>>>>> clever enough to inject new packets (new conntracks) at the right
>>>>> moment, in the right hash chain, and this sounds so higly incredible
>>>>> that I cannot believe it at all :)
>>>> Or maybe the DoS attack is injecting so many new conntracks that a large
>>>> fraction of the hash chains are being modified at any given time?
>>>>
>> I think its plausable, there is a lot of modification going on.
>> Approx 40.000 deletes/sec and 40.000 inserts/sec.
>> The hash bucket size is 300032, and with 80000 modifications/sec, we are 
>> (potentially) changing 26.6% of the hash chains each second.
>>
> 
> OK but a lookup last a fraction of a micro second, unless interrupted by
> hard irq.
> 
> Probability of a change during a lookup should be very very small.
> 
> Note that the scenario for a restart is :
> 
> The lookup go through the chain.
> While it is examining one object, this object is deleted.
> The object is re-allocated by another cpu and inserted to a new chain.

I think another scenario that seems a bit more likely would be
that a new entry is added to the chain after it was fully searched.
Perhaps we could continue searching at the last position if the
last entry is not a nulls entry to improve this.
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