From: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
To: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com>
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org,
Netfilter Core Team <coreteam@netfilter.org>
Subject: Re: Whither xt_SYSRQ?
Date: Fri, 14 May 2010 12:23:00 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4BED2484.2000206@trash.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4BED1478.9090604@oracle.com>
John Haxby wrote:
> On 11/05/10 18:06, Patrick McHardy wrote:
>> John Haxby wrote:
>>
>>> The standalone module is troublesome. If I was starting from scratch
>>> with that I'd be putting in filters and whatnot that match those
>>> provides by xtables anyway. If everything apart from the actual
>>> function (sysrq) and password control is duplicated by xtables then
>>> you'd have to ask "why isn't this part of xtables?".
>>>
>> The main point for putting it in a stand-alone module is that it
>> is providing a network service. You could still use netfilter to
>> filter packets of course. I don't see where the big trouble is,
>> instead of using netfilter for receiving packets, you open up
>> a socket. That's basically it.
>>
>>
>
> /me slaps forehead
>
> Sometimes the obvious just fails to make it through. Yes, that makes a
> good deal of sense, I'll see how it pans out. I'm currently wondering
> what happens when a machine is locked up whether or not I can get the
> service scheduled (one way or another) -- the netfilter stuff seems to
> be pretty robust in the face of machines locking up quite hard.
Netfilter receive processing runs in BH context. Its a bit of a hack,
but you could run your code in the same context by using a UDP socket
and marking it as encapsulation socket, see udp_queue_rcv_skb().
>> Lets see what other netfilter developers think, I'm easy to convince:)
>> One thing I'd like to see in any case however is review of the crypto
>> parts by the crypto people.
>>
>
> I'd like to see that as well. I _think_ I've got the crypto stuff right
> but I do know that self-review for anything security related is
> basically worthless. (As Bruce Schneier said, paraphrased slightly: any
> fool can produce a security solution that they can't crack.)
I'd suggest to copy the linux-crypto list on the next submission and
ask for review.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-05-14 10:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-05-11 14:32 Whither xt_SYSRQ? John Haxby
2010-05-11 17:06 ` Patrick McHardy
2010-05-14 9:14 ` John Haxby
2010-05-14 10:23 ` Patrick McHardy [this message]
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