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From: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: "Марк Коренберг" <socketpair@gmail.com>,
	"David Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Fwd: Simple kernel attack using socketpair. easy, 100% reproductiblle, works under guest. no way to protect :(
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 2010 12:38:07 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4CEF39AF.6090605@cn.fujitsu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1290694299.2858.330.camel@edumazet-laptop>

Eric Dumazet wrote, at 11/25/2010 10:11 PM:
> Le jeudi 25 novembre 2010 à 13:35 +0500, Марк Коренберг a écrit :
>> quick and dirty fix will be not to allow to pass unix socket inside
>> unix socket. I think it would not break much applications.
> 
> Really, if it was not needed, net/unix/garbage.c would not exist at
> all...
> 
> It is needed by some apps.
> 
> 
> [PATCH] af_unix: limit recursion level
> 
> Its easy to eat all kernel memory and trigger NMI watchdog, using an
> exploit program that queues unix sockets on top of others.
> 
> lkml ref : http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/11/25/8
> 
> This mechanism is used in applications, one choice we have is to have a
> recursion limit.
> 
> Other limits might be needed as well (if we queue other types of files),
> since the passfd mechanism is currently limited by socket receive queue
> sizes only.
> 
> Add a recursion_level to unix socket, allowing up to 4 levels.
> 
> Each time we send an unix socket through sendfd mechanism, we copy its
> recursion level (plus one) to receiver. This recursion level is cleared
> when socket receive queue is emptied.
> 
> Reported-by: Марк Коренберг <socketpair@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>

This problem is same as that reported with title "Unix socket local DOS (OOM)", right?
After applied this patch, this program can be killed now. but still eat 100% cpu. 

-- 
Best Regards
-----
Shan Wei

  reply	other threads:[~2010-11-26  4:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-11-25  5:57 Simple kernel attack using socketpair. easy, 100% reproductiblle, works under guest. no way to protect :( Марк Коренберг
2010-11-25  6:28 ` Eric Dumazet
2010-11-25  6:52   ` Марк Коренберг
     [not found]     ` <1290668246.2798.93.camel@edumazet-laptop>
     [not found]       ` <AANLkTinQa8BCH-k0m=ndu4u8L-kCiD00jYjKvsvoxK2E@mail.gmail.com>
2010-11-25  7:52         ` Fwd: " Марк Коренберг
2010-11-25  8:16           ` Eric Dumazet
2010-11-25  8:35             ` Марк Коренберг
2010-11-25 14:11               ` Eric Dumazet
2010-11-26  4:38                 ` Shan Wei [this message]
2010-11-26  6:23                   ` Eric Dumazet
2010-11-26  7:52                     ` Shan Wei
2010-11-26  7:41                 ` Shan Wei
2010-11-26  8:22                   ` Eric Dumazet
2010-11-26  8:59                     ` Eric Dumazet
2010-11-29 17:46                 ` David Miller
2010-11-29 18:01                   ` Eric Dumazet
     [not found]       ` <AANLkTinRhmiVoVR5ibWOKe-OhY4fYUs_PHSATjxMGqg9@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]         ` <1290670889.2798.127.camel@edumazet-laptop>
2010-11-25  8:05           ` Марк Коренберг
2010-11-25  7:14   ` Eric Dumazet

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