From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
To: Qwyjibo Jones <qwyjibojones@gmail.com>
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: SELinux role separation
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2011 16:51:34 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4D375CE6.7030107@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTimcB_2Dt6fetoDZ_Da0CaWKFDHv-UA=pA3P-Oc7@mail.gmail.com>
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On 01/19/2011 04:44 PM, Qwyjibo Jones wrote:
> I don't seem to have the "allow_sysadm_manage_security" boolean. Do I
> need to create it somehow and put it under /selinux/booleans ?
>
> # getsebool -a | grep allow_sysadm_manage_security
> # getsebool -a | grep allow_sysadm
> # getsebool -a | grep sysadm
> allow_httpd_sysadm_script_anon_write --> off
> ssh_sysadm_login --> off
> staff_read_sysadm_file --> off
> xdm_sysadm_login --> off
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> On Wed, Jan 19, 2011 at 3:11 PM, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com
> <mailto:dwalsh@redhat.com>> wrote:
>
> On 01/18/2011 01:03 PM, Qwyjibo Jones wrote:
>
>> I am currently working with an Itanium2 system which has RHEL 5.3 MLS
>> installed.
>> I am trying to understand how separation of roles works in SELinux/MLS
>> policy version 21. We have been told that we need to separate
> roles that
>> the sys admin is no longer allowed to do.
>
>> After reading through these threads, in the archives I am still
>> wondering about a couple things:
>
>
> http://www.nsa.gov/research/selinux/list-archive/0504/thread_body66.shtml#11082
>
>> And this one:
>
> http://www.nsa.gov/research/selinux/list-archive/0802/thread_body60.shtml
>
>> 1) Is the RHEL 5.x MLS policy version 21 capable of the following
>> separation of sysadm_r and secadm_r roles:
>
>> a) Can the secadm_r role be the only role that can assign roles via
>> semanage?
>
>> c) Can the secadm_r role be the only role that can control
> files used
>> in auditing, like auditd.conf. audit.rules, /etc/init.d/auditd etc...
>
> auditadm_r:auditadm_t is only allowed to modify these files.
>
>> 2) Is this better accomplished with a combination of SUDO and SELinux?
> Since sysadm_t can hack his way around the SELinux controls via tools
> like rpm and fdisk, you are better off using sudo to further restrict
> his actions, if possible.
>> 3) How can I determine what secadm_r can do in the current
>> configuration? can any of the CLI tools show me that? ( no gui tools
>> available )
>
> You probably want to look at secadm_t
>
> sesearch -A -t secadm_t
>
>> If not, what about RHEL 6 ? ( I understand RHEL 6 is not available to
>> Itanium systems, but we may have new hardware soon)
>
>> Any tips. hints, pointers etc... would be very helpfull.
>
>> Thanks for your time,
>
Oops I misread the policy, I guess we abandoned the separation.
ifdef(`enable_mls',`
userdom_security_administrator(secadm_t,secadm_r,{
secadm_tty_device_t sysadm_devpts_t })
# tunable_policy(`allow_sysadm_manage_security',`
userdom_security_administrator(sysadm_t,sysadm_r,admin_terminal)
# ')
Missed the "#" at the beginning of the lines. So I don't think we
prevent sysadm_t from managing the security, of course he has to be able
to run at SystemHigh.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-01-19 21:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-01-18 18:03 SELinux role separation Qwyjibo Jones
2011-01-19 19:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2011-01-19 20:11 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-01-19 21:44 ` Qwyjibo Jones
2011-01-19 21:47 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-01-19 21:51 ` Daniel J Walsh [this message]
2011-01-20 13:43 ` Qwyjibo Jones
2011-01-20 13:45 ` Qwyjibo Jones
2011-01-20 14:21 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-01-20 14:23 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-01-20 17:05 ` Qwyjibo Jones
2011-02-19 14:25 ` Qwyjibo Jones
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