From: domg472@gmail.com (Dominick Grift)
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH 2/34]: patch for the usermanage module
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2011 21:55:54 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4D5C39DA.6080904@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110216204341.GA5937@siphos.be>
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On 02/16/2011 09:43 PM, Sven Vermeulen wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 07:00:49AM +0100, Guido Trentalancia wrote:
>> # allow checking if a shell is executable
>> corecmd_check_exec_shell(passwd_t)
>> +corecmd_exec_bin(passwd_t)
>
> I'm curious why anything in the passwd_t domain wants to execute a bin_t
> labelled file? Afaik, the applications labelled with passwd_exec_t (and thus
> will potentially run in passwd_t) are passwd, vigr, vipw, chage, passwd,
> grpconv, pwunconv and grpunconv. Which of these is trying to execute a
> bin_t (and which command exactly)?
I am aware of atleast one bin_t app that password wants to execute in
Fedora when you change your password in Gnome account information:
gnome-keyring-daemon (allowing it will not make it work anyway). I would
like to know as well which bin_t files password is trying to execute. I
would more likely not allow this.
> Wkr,
> Sven Vermeulen
> _______________________________________________
> refpolicy mailing list
> refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
> http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-02-16 20:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-02-16 6:00 [refpolicy] [PATCH 2/34]: patch for the usermanage module Guido Trentalancia
2011-02-16 20:43 ` Sven Vermeulen
2011-02-16 20:55 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-02-16 22:20 ` Guido Trentalancia
2011-02-16 20:55 ` Dominick Grift [this message]
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