From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([140.186.70.92]:45837) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1QWumI-0000gm-P0 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 15 Jun 2011 14:25:24 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1QWumG-0005ZG-MO for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 15 Jun 2011 14:25:22 -0400 Received: from e1.ny.us.ibm.com ([32.97.182.141]:42155) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1QWueE-0004Sn-P9 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 15 Jun 2011 14:17:02 -0400 Received: from d01relay03.pok.ibm.com (d01relay03.pok.ibm.com [9.56.227.235]) by e1.ny.us.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1) with ESMTP id p5FI4w3E030633 for ; Wed, 15 Jun 2011 14:04:58 -0400 Received: from d03av04.boulder.ibm.com (d03av04.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.195.170]) by d01relay03.pok.ibm.com (8.13.8/8.13.8/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id p5FIGgTZ133016 for ; Wed, 15 Jun 2011 14:16:42 -0400 Received: from d03av04.boulder.ibm.com (loopback [127.0.0.1]) by d03av04.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVout) with ESMTP id p5FCGd5s003602 for ; Wed, 15 Jun 2011 06:16:39 -0600 Message-ID: <4DF8F706.4080709@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2011 11:16:38 -0700 From: Venkateswararao Jujjuri MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20110614081244.GB3428@in.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH] virtio-9p: Use clone approach to fix TOCTOU vulnerability List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: Stefan Hajnoczi Cc: mohan@in.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org On 06/15/2011 10:35 AM, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote: > On Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 9:12 AM, M. Mohan Kumar wrote: >> [RFC PATCH] virtio-9p: Use clone approach to fix TOCTOU vulnerability >> >> In passthrough security model, following a symbolic link in the server >> side could result in TOCTTOU vulnerability. >> >> Use clone system call to create a thread which runs in chrooted >> environment. All passthrough model file operations are done from this >> thread to avoid TOCTTOU vulnerability. > How will chroot(2) work when QEMU runs as non-root (i.e. secure > production environments)? > This is used only in passthrough mode; passthrough mode needs root access by design. There is no TOCTTOU vulnerability in mapped mode as symlinks are not actual symlinks on host FS. JV > Stefan