From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
SE-Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [refpolicy] pam_selinux(gdm-password:session): Security Context justin:staff_r:insmod_t:s0 Assigned
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2011 09:38:25 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4E808051.7090208@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1316819560.2652.2.camel@localhost>
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On 09/23/2011 07:12 PM, Eric Paris wrote:
> On Sat, 2011-09-24 at 00:38 +0200, Guido Trentalancia wrote:
>> Hello Eric.
>>
>> On Fri, 2011-09-23 at 17:17 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
>>> On Fri, 2011-09-23 at 23:12 +0200, Guido Trentalancia wrote:
>>>
>>>> You seem to suggest that load_policy -i (and not the kernel)
>>>> should make sure that init has transitioned to its designated
>>>> context...
>>>
>>> Can't speak for Justin's system.
>>
>> That's for sure. But it seems to me that he already stated that
>> it just loaded plain refpolicy from git on a plain F15 system.
>> Since we are on the list he might even confirm once again...
>>
>>> But that's not what I said. I said it's /sbin/init's problem
>>> to make sure it did the right thing and to handle errors
>>> correctly if it failed. If Justin has his box enforcing and
>>> can boot without loading a policy that's a bug and needs to be
>>> filed.
>>
>> He has loaded the policy.
>>
>> The point is that when init does not transition to init_t
>> nothing happens and the system keeps running with all processes
>> in kernel_t or insmod_t.
>>
>> It surely use to happen with upstream components and policy back
>> at the beginning of this year (I did test that and reported it to
>> the refpolicy mailing list).
>>
>> Apparently it also happens with Fedora 15 according to what
>> Justin reported on here when he started this thread...
>>
>> Earlier on Daniel Walsh said Fedora and RHEL would crash in such
>> case (init has not transitioned properly to init_t).
>
> Ahhh, different than I was talking sorry. In upstream systemd git
> the code in question looks like so:
>
> /* Transition to the new context */ r =
> label_get_create_label_from_exe(SYSTEMD_BINARY_PATH, &label); if (r
> < 0 || label == NULL) { log_open(); log_error("Failed to compute
> init label, ignoring."); } else { r = setcon(label);
>
> log_open(); if (r < 0) log_error("Failed to transition into init
> label '%s', ignoring.", label);
>
> label_free(label); }
>
> sds, what do you think, should we make these? We do know the
> requisite enforce state in this function...
>
> -Eric
>
>
> -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux
> mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to
> majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux"
> without quotes as the message.
>
>
The failure is in the init load_policy. It should crash if this
fails. If anything fails after that is is out of SELinux hands I
believe, since you are not sure what the policy writers intention was.
I believe we would get to this state if the policy writer wanted to
run systemd in the initial state (kernel_t) and not transition.
But maybe on failure of this call we should fail the machine in
enforcing mode.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-09-26 13:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-09-16 3:40 [refpolicy] pam_selinux(gdm-password:session): Security Context justin:staff_r:insmod_t:s0 Assigned Justin Mattock
2011-09-16 14:59 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-09-16 14:59 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-09-16 15:22 ` Justin P. Mattock
2011-09-16 15:58 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-09-16 15:58 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-09-16 16:11 ` Guido Trentalancia
2011-09-16 16:11 ` Guido Trentalancia
2011-09-16 16:11 ` Justin P. Mattock
2011-09-23 16:30 ` Guido Trentalancia
2011-09-23 17:38 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-09-23 19:09 ` Guido Trentalancia
2011-09-23 20:45 ` Eric Paris
2011-09-23 21:12 ` Guido Trentalancia
2011-09-23 21:17 ` Eric Paris
2011-09-23 22:38 ` Guido Trentalancia
2011-09-23 23:12 ` Eric Paris
2011-09-26 13:38 ` Daniel J Walsh [this message]
2011-09-27 12:46 ` Stephen Smalley
2011-09-27 16:40 ` Guido Trentalancia
2011-09-27 18:00 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-09-16 16:02 ` Guido Trentalancia
2011-09-16 16:02 ` Guido Trentalancia
2011-09-16 16:18 ` Justin P. Mattock
2011-09-16 16:27 ` Guido Trentalancia
2011-09-16 16:27 ` Guido Trentalancia
2011-09-16 16:33 ` Justin P. Mattock
2011-09-16 16:24 ` Justin P. Mattock
2011-09-16 16:30 ` Guido Trentalancia
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