From: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
To: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, shaohua.li@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
mhocko@suse.cz, alex.shi@intel.com, efault@gmx.de,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL rcu/next] RCU commits for 3.1
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2011 16:09:19 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4EAE57AF.1060706@cn.fujitsu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20111029182710.GG6160@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
(Let's cc Peter and Paul Turner for this perf cgroup issue.)
> Thank you for the analysis. Does the following patch fix this problem?
>
> Thanx, Paul
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> fs: Add RCU protection in set_task_comm()
>
> Running "perf stat true" results in the following RCU-lockdep splat:
>
> ===============================
> [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
> -------------------------------
> include/linux/cgroup.h:548 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
>
> other info that might help us debug this:
>
> rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
> 1 lock held by true/655:
> #0: (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<810d1bd7>] prepare_bprm_creds+0x27/0x70
>
> stack backtrace:
> Pid: 655, comm: true Not tainted 3.1.0-tip-01868-g1271bd2-dirty #161079
> Call Trace:
> [<81abe239>] ? printk+0x18/0x1a
> [<81064920>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xc0/0xd0
> [<8108aa02>] perf_event_enable_on_exec+0x1d2/0x1e0
> [<81063764>] ? __lock_release+0x54/0xb0
> [<8108cca8>] perf_event_comm+0x18/0x60
> [<810d1abd>] ? set_task_comm+0x5d/0x80
> [<81af622d>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1d/0x40
> [<810d1ac4>] set_task_comm+0x64/0x80
> [<810d25fd>] setup_new_exec+0xbd/0x1d0
> [<810d1b61>] ? flush_old_exec+0x81/0xa0
> [<8110753e>] load_elf_binary+0x28e/0xa00
> [<810d2101>] ? search_binary_handler+0xd1/0x1d0
> [<81063764>] ? __lock_release+0x54/0xb0
> [<811072b0>] ? load_elf_library+0x260/0x260
> [<810d2108>] search_binary_handler+0xd8/0x1d0
> [<810d2060>] ? search_binary_handler+0x30/0x1d0
> [<810d242f>] do_execve_common+0x22f/0x2a0
> [<810d24b2>] do_execve+0x12/0x20
> [<81009592>] sys_execve+0x32/0x70
> [<81af7752>] ptregs_execve+0x12/0x20
> [<81af76d4>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x36
>
> Li Zefan noted that this is due to set_task_comm() dropping the task
> lock before invoking perf_event_comm(), which could in fact result in
> the task being freed up before perf_event_comm() completed tracing in
> the case where one task invokes set_task_comm() on another task -- which
> actually does occur via comm_write(), which can be invoked via /proc.
>
This is not true. The caller should ensure @tsk is valid during
set_task_comm().
The warning comes from perf_cgroup_from_task(). We can trigger this warning
in some other cases where perf cgroup is used, for example:
# mount -t cgroup -o perf_event xxx /mnt
# ./perf record -a -e 'sched:*' -G / true
[ 171.603171] ===============================
[ 171.603173] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
[ 171.603175] -------------------------------
[ 171.603178] include/linux/cgroup.h:548 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
[ 171.603180]
[ 171.603181] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 171.603182]
[ 171.603184]
[ 171.603185] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
[ 171.603188] 2 locks held by perf/2899:
[ 171.603190] #0: (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<c04b2fe7>] sys_perf_event_open+0x4ed/0x62a
[ 171.603201] #1: (&cpuctx_lock){......}, at: [<c04ac4bc>] perf_ctx_lock+0xe/0x1d
[ 171.603210]
[ 171.603211] stack backtrace:
[ 171.603214] Pid: 2899, comm: perf Not tainted 3.1.0+ #12
[ 171.603216] Call Trace:
[ 171.603222] [<c07e7234>] ? printk+0x25/0x29
[ 171.603227] [<c046279d>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x90/0x9b
[ 171.603232] [<c04ac688>] perf_cgroup_from_task+0x5e/0x64
[ 171.603236] [<c04adfe7>] update_cgrp_time_from_event.clone.18+0x16/0x25
[ 171.603240] [<c04b01a1>] __perf_install_in_context+0xa0/0xcf
[ 171.603244] [<c04ac355>] ? pmu_dev_release+0xa/0xa
[ 171.603248] [<c04ac386>] remote_function+0x31/0x37
[ 171.603253] [<c0468aaa>] smp_call_function_single+0x7d/0xf5
[ 171.603257] [<c04ac41d>] cpu_function_call+0x29/0x2e
[ 171.603261] [<c04b0101>] ? perf_pm_suspend_cpu+0x9f/0x9f
[ 171.603264] [<c04ae85b>] perf_install_in_context+0x53/0x9f
[ 171.603268] [<c04b3033>] sys_perf_event_open+0x539/0x62a
[ 171.603273] [<c04566f5>] ? up_read+0x1b/0x2e
[ 171.603277] [<c07ec856>] ? do_page_fault+0x2e6/0x314
[ 171.603283] [<c07ef2df>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x38
> This commit fixes this problem by entering an RCU read-side critical
> section before acquiring the task lock and exiting this critical section
> after perf_event_comm() returns.
>
> Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index 25dcbe5..fb928d3 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1056,6 +1056,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_task_comm);
>
> void set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, char *buf)
> {
> + rcu_read_lock(); /* protect task pointer through tracing. */
> task_lock(tsk);
>
> /*
> @@ -1069,6 +1070,7 @@ void set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, char *buf)
> strlcpy(tsk->comm, buf, sizeof(tsk->comm));
> task_unlock(tsk);
> perf_event_comm(tsk);
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> }
>
> int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-10-31 8:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20110930204503.GA32687@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[not found] ` <20111001152514.GA16930@elte.hu>
[not found] ` <20111003055302.GA23527@elte.hu>
[not found] ` <20111003161335.GA2403@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2011-10-04 7:46 ` [GIT PULL rcu/next] RCU commits for 3.1 Ingo Molnar
2011-10-24 10:05 ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-10-24 11:48 ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-10-26 20:30 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-10-27 7:59 ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-10-27 8:00 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-10-28 2:34 ` Li Zefan
2011-10-29 18:27 ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-10-31 8:09 ` Li Zefan [this message]
2011-10-31 9:32 ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-11-01 2:37 ` Li Zefan
2011-11-02 19:23 ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-11-02 19:55 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-03 12:50 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-04 8:44 ` Li Zefan
2011-11-04 9:02 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 14:24 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 14:41 ` Eric Dumazet
2011-11-07 14:44 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 15:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2011-11-07 16:16 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 16:35 ` Peter Zijlstra
2011-11-07 16:56 ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-11-07 17:09 ` Peter Zijlstra
2011-11-07 17:55 ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-11-08 13:10 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 17:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2011-11-07 17:12 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 17:26 ` Peter Zijlstra
2011-11-07 17:50 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 17:53 ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-11-07 17:53 ` Paul E. McKenney
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