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From: Dor Laor <dlaor@redhat.com>
To: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <radimkrcmar@hpx.cz>,
	wad@chromium.org, "Richa Marwaha" <rmarwah@us.ibm.com>,
	"Corey Bryant" <coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"Michael Halcrow" <mhalcrow@google.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, "Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <pmoore@redhat.com>,
	"George Wilson" <gcwilson@us.ibm.com>,
	"Avi Kivity" <avi@redhat.com>, "Amit Shah" <amit.shah@redhat.com>,
	"Ashley D Lai" <adlai@us.ibm.com>,
	"Eduardo Terrell Ferrari Otubo" <eotubo@br.ibm.com>,
	"Lee Terrell" <lterrell@us.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC] Device sandboxing
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2011 12:50:02 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4EE48ADA.9000908@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJSP0QU2DEy2MeXk0uQaFRYmb2eor+wqa1AXn3pTyqV9fiAWUw@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/08/2011 11:40 AM, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 7, 2011 at 8:54 PM, Eric Paris<eparis@redhat.com>  wrote:
>> On Wed, 2011-12-07 at 13:43 -0600, Anthony Liguori wrote:
>>> On 12/07/2011 01:32 PM, Corey Bryant wrote:
>>
>>>> That would seem like the logical approach. I think there may be new mode 2
>>>> patches coming soon so we can see how they go over.
>>>
>>> I'd like to see what the whitelist would need to be for something like QEMU in
>>> mode 2.  My biggest concern is that the whitelist would need to be so large that
>>> the practical security what's all that much improved.
>>
>> When I prototyped my version of seccomp v2 for qemu a while back I did
>> it by only looking at syscalls after inital setup was completed (aka the
>> very last thing before main_loop() was to lock it down).  My list was
>> much sorter than even these:
>>
>> +        __NR_brk,
>> +        __NR_close,
>> +        __NR_exit_group,
>> +        __NR_futex,
>> +        __NR_ioctl,
>> +        __NR_madvise,
>> +        __NR_mmap,
>> +        __NR_munmap,
>> +        __NR_read,
>> +        __NR_recvfrom,
>> +        __NR_recvmsg,
>> +        __NR_rt_sigaction,
>> +        __NR_select,
>> +        __NR_sendto,
>> +        __NR_tgkill,
>> +        __NR_timer_delete,
>> +        __NR_timer_gettime,
>> +        __NR_timer_settime,
>> +        __NR_write,
>> +        __NR_writev,
>>
>> There is simple obvious negligible overhead value here, but every
>> proposal I know of, including mine, has been shot down by Ingo.  Ingo's
>> proposal is much more work, more overhead, but clearly more flexible.
>> His suggestions (and code based on those suggestions from others) has
>> been shot down by PeterZ.
>>
>> So I feel like seccomp v2 is between a rock and a hard place.  We have
>> something that works really well, and could be a huge win for all sorts
>> of programs, but we don't seem to be able to get anything past the
>> damned if you do, damned if you don't nak's.....
>>
>> (There's also a cgroup version of seccomp proposed, but I'm guessing it
>> will go just about as far as all the other versions)
>
> Still, these sorts of situations are overcome all the time.  Sometimes
> it takes a while and several LWN.net articles about the drama but at
> the end things can be worked out.
>
> If we want to discuss the specifics of mode 2 and especially what Ingo
> or Peter think then I think we should do it in a forum where they
> participate.  Maybe their positions have changed.

Will, little bird whispered that you'll going to send another iteration 
w/ higher acceptance chances. Where do we stand w/ it? Can you please 
elaborate on it chance to get merged?

>
> Stefan
>

  reply	other threads:[~2011-12-11 10:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-12-07 18:25 [Qemu-devel] [RFC] Device sandboxing Corey Bryant
2011-12-07 18:48 ` Anthony Liguori
2011-12-07 19:32   ` Corey Bryant
2011-12-07 19:43     ` Anthony Liguori
2011-12-07 19:52       ` Michael Halcrow
2011-12-07 20:02       ` Corey Bryant
2011-12-07 20:54       ` Eric Paris
2011-12-08  9:40         ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2011-12-11 10:50           ` Dor Laor [this message]
2011-12-12 18:54             ` Will Drewry
2011-12-08  9:47     ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2011-12-08 14:39       ` Corey Bryant
2011-12-07 21:20   ` Paul Moore
2011-12-14 17:15     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-12-14 23:56       ` Paul Moore
2011-12-15 14:28         ` Corey Bryant
2011-12-15 15:14           ` Serge Hallyn
2011-12-15 15:35             ` Paul Moore
2011-12-15 16:05               ` Serge Hallyn
2011-12-08 21:51 ` Blue Swirl
2011-12-12 18:30   ` Corey Bryant
2011-12-09 16:17 ` Paul Brook
2011-12-09 16:34   ` Paul Moore
2011-12-09 17:32     ` Paul Brook
2011-12-09 17:49       ` Paul Moore
2011-12-09 18:46         ` Paul Brook
2011-12-09 18:50           ` Paul Moore
2011-12-09 18:59           ` Paul Brook
2011-12-09 19:17             ` Paul Moore
2011-12-10 19:39   ` Blue Swirl
2011-12-11  9:08   ` Avi Kivity

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