From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
To: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: SELinux with initramfs
Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2012 13:16:05 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4F1DA3E5.5030608@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120121192447.GA5909@siphos.be>
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On 01/21/2012 02:24 PM, Sven Vermeulen wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 09:46:58AM -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>> In RHEL and Fedora, we relabel the parts of /dev that are created
>> in the initramfs and restart udev so it is a child of
>> init/systemd.
>
> When do you relabel them? When I call setfiles before the
> load_policy, I get an 'Operation not supported' on /dev as if it
> was a kernel that doesn't support extended attributes on tmpfs
> (which isn't the case). Trying to call it afterwards doesn't work,
> since the kernel_t domain doesn't allow relabeling (I think, output
> is also missing since /dev/console is wrongly labeled).
I think /sbin/init on Fedora is doing the relabeling, so init_t. On
older RHEl versions, udev is doing the relabeling udev_t.
>
> I'm quite close to have support for both putting the policy in the
> initramfs itself (and call load_policy as one of the first things
> done on the initramfs environment) and supporting booting in
> permissive mode and have a switch to enforcing which can't be
> undone afterwards (goal is to boot in enforcing).
>
> The first support option probably allows for such a sane boot but
> requires the policy to be in the initramfs. The other one allows us
> to boot properly and I just toggle "setenforce 1" with the
> secure_mode_policyload boolean enabled afterwards.
>
> But both sound hackish - If I could only understand why I can't use
> setfiles on /dev before calling load_policy...
>
> Wkr, Sven Vermeulen
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-01-23 18:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-01-14 14:20 SELinux with initramfs Sven Vermeulen
2012-01-14 14:34 ` Sven Vermeulen
2012-01-14 15:46 ` Chris PeBenito
2012-01-16 14:46 ` Daniel J Walsh
2012-01-21 19:24 ` Sven Vermeulen
2012-01-23 18:16 ` Daniel J Walsh [this message]
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