From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>,
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>,
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@gmail.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com>,
Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>,
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Subject: Re: [RFC c/r 2/4] [RFC] syscalls, x86: Add __NR_kcmp syscall v7
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2012 10:05:18 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4F22E75E.6090602@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120127175939.795551339@openvz.org>
On 01/27/2012 09:53 AM, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> +
> +/*
> + * We don't expose real in-memory order of objects for security
> + * reasons, still the comparision results should be suitable for
> + * sorting. Thus, we obfuscate kernel pointers values (using random
> + * cookies obtaned at early boot stage) and compare the production
> + * instead.
> + */
> +static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly;
> +
> +static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type)
> +{
> + return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1];
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * 0 - equal
> + * 1 - less than
> + * 2 - greater than
> + * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future)
> + */
> +static int kcmp_ptr(long v1, long v2, enum kcmp_type type)
> +{
> + long ret;
> +
> + ret = kptr_obfuscate(v1, type) - kptr_obfuscate(v2, type);
> +
> + return (ret < 0) | ((ret > 0) << 1);
> +}
> +
I just want to point out that we could do hard cryptography, too --
using DES or AES and compare the result since symmetric cryptography is
an isomorphism. One would have to compare the whole result, obviously,
not a truncated one, so using memcmp() or the similar.
I'll leave it up to the security guys to worry about if that is needed,
but since it is something that can be slotted in without changing the
API it seems reasonably safe.
-hpa
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-01-27 18:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-01-27 17:53 [RFC c/r 0/4] [RFC c/r 0/@total@] A pile in c/r sake Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 17:53 ` [RFC c/r 1/4] fs, proc: Introduce /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children entry v9 Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 17:53 ` [RFC c/r 2/4] [RFC] syscalls, x86: Add __NR_kcmp syscall v7 Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 18:05 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2012-01-27 18:11 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 18:15 ` Andi Kleen
2012-01-27 18:24 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 18:30 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-01-28 17:19 ` Michael Kerrisk
2012-01-28 17:34 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-28 17:36 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 18:31 ` Andi Kleen
2012-01-27 18:40 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 19:40 ` Andi Kleen
2012-01-27 20:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-01-27 18:40 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-01-27 18:45 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 19:10 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 19:37 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2012-01-27 19:59 ` hpanvin@gmail.com
2012-01-27 20:07 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 20:19 ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2012-01-27 20:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-01-27 20:50 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 21:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-01-27 20:34 ` Glauber Costa
2012-01-27 20:37 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-01-27 20:47 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 17:53 ` [RFC c/r 3/4] c/r: procfs: add arg_start/end, env_start/end and exit_code members to /proc/$pid/stat Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 18:29 ` Kees Cook
2012-01-27 20:00 ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2012-01-27 20:10 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 17:53 ` [RFC c/r 4/4] c/r: prctl: Extend PR_SET_MM to set up more mm_struct entries Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2012-01-27 18:43 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-01-27 20:31 ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2012-01-27 20:28 ` KOSAKI Motohiro
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