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From: dwalsh@redhat.com (Daniel J Walsh)
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] chsh (chfn_t) to access /etc/.pwd.lock (shadow_t) ?
Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2012 16:31:31 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4F7223A3.9090409@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120327192447.GA2101@siphos.be>

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On 03/27/2012 03:24 PM, Sven Vermeulen wrote:
> In Gentoo, we notice that recent shadow package (version 4.1.5) has a change in behavior for changing account information through chsh. Although the application only edits /etc/passwd entries, it now uses the /etc/.pwd.lock file to prevent concurrent changes to the /etc/passwd (and other account-related files).
> 
> In the current policy however, /etc/.pwd.lock is marked as shadow_t, so the chsh application (running in chfn_t) does not have the proper privileges to work on this. As a result, it fails to update /etc/passwd entries.
> 
> As I'm not going to give it read/write access to shadow_t files, one other possibility would be to mark /etc/.pwd.lock as etc_t. But I can imagine that it was given shadow_t on purpose previously, probably to prevent a malicious program (that has write access to etc_t) to update the lock file so concurrent write operations on /etc/shadow could result in corruption...
> 
> Another solution would be to patch chsh itself to use a different lock file, but unless it's accepted upstream, it's only a "local" remedy.
> 
> A third solution would be to create and use a different type for it, like etc_auth_lock_t or whatever imagination can bring to life, and update the policies of all domains that need access to it towards it.
> 
> Any thoughts on this?
> 
> Wkr, Sven Vermeulen
> 
> _______________________________________________ refpolicy mailing list refpolicy at oss.tresys.com http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
Being able to write to etc_t is basically the same as being able to write to shadow_t, if /etc/passwd is labeled as etc_t.
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  reply	other threads:[~2012-03-27 20:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-03-27 19:24 [refpolicy] chsh (chfn_t) to access /etc/.pwd.lock (shadow_t) ? Sven Vermeulen
2012-03-27 20:31 ` Daniel J Walsh [this message]
2012-03-28 16:52   ` Sven Vermeulen
2012-03-28 17:15     ` Daniel J Walsh
2012-03-27 23:47 ` Russell Coker
2012-03-27 23:51   ` Russell Coker
2012-03-28 16:53     ` Sven Vermeulen

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