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From: Thomas Goirand <thomas@goirand.fr>
To: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Subject: Re: Security vulnerability process, and CVE-2012-0217
Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 23:48:41 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4FEDCE59.6020003@goirand.fr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFLBxZYWnW_d8YDeFdzjdUhyysqxd12gPU4Pr6Rj7LQjtLwx+A@mail.gmail.com>

On 06/29/2012 06:01 PM, George Dunlap wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 7:07 PM, Thomas Goirand <thomas@goirand.fr> wrote:
>> On 06/20/2012 05:45 PM, George Dunlap wrote:
>>> The only way this would work is if the predisclosure list consisted
>>> exclusively of software providers, and specifically excluded service
>>> providers.
>> I agree, though you might have corner cases.
>>
>> What if you are *both* software and service provider (eg: I'm working on
>> Debian and XCP, and my small company provides a hosted Xen service)?
> 
> If we do make a rule that only software providers can be on the list,
> and not service providers, then ideally you should try to separate the
> roles.  If you are on the list as a software provider, you should use
> that information only to prepare patches; but not deploy them on your
> own systems until the embargo date.
> 
> In a way, the question is very similar to asking, "I'm working on
> Debian and XCP, and my best friend owns a small company that provides
> a hosted Xen service."  If you told your friend about the
> vulnerability, you would be breaking the security embargo (and giving
> your friend an unfair advantage over other hosting services), and
> would be at risk of being removed from the list if someone found out.
> If you wear two "hats", as it were, the same would be true if your
> developer "hat" told your service provider "hat": actually updating
> your systems before the embargo would (I think) be considered breaking
> the embargo, and would be giving yourself an unfair advantage over
> other hosting services.
> 
> (All of the above discussion is, of course, only valid in the
> hypothetical situation that we don't allow service providers to be on
> the list.)
> 
>  -George

Exactly what I think as well. I'm happy you wrote the above.

Thomas

  reply	other threads:[~2012-06-29 15:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-06-19 18:16 Security vulnerability process, and CVE-2012-0217 Ian Jackson
2012-06-20  8:49 ` Jan Beulich
2012-06-20  9:45   ` George Dunlap
2012-06-20 10:32     ` Jan Beulich
2012-07-02 13:59       ` Ian Campbell
2012-07-02 14:58         ` Jan Beulich
2012-07-02 15:04           ` Ian Campbell
2012-07-02 15:17         ` Alan Cox
2012-07-02 15:20           ` Ian Campbell
2012-06-28 18:30   ` Alan Cox
2012-07-04  9:27     ` Ian Campbell
2012-07-04 10:04       ` John Haxby
2012-06-29 10:26   ` George Dunlap
2012-06-29 10:41     ` Jan Beulich
2012-07-02 14:00   ` Ian Campbell
2012-06-23 19:42 ` Matt Wilson
2012-06-28 17:45   ` George Dunlap
2012-07-02 13:59     ` Ian Campbell
2012-06-27 18:07 ` Thomas Goirand
2012-06-27 19:14   ` Alan Cox
2012-06-27 19:30   ` Sander Eikelenboom
2012-06-28  9:28   ` Lars Kurth
2012-07-02 13:58     ` Ian Campbell
2012-07-02 14:51       ` Jan Beulich
2012-07-02 14:57         ` Ian Campbell
2012-07-03 22:03     ` Matt Wilson
2012-07-04 10:33       ` Ian Campbell
2012-07-04 11:24       ` Stefano Stabellini
2012-07-04 12:36         ` George Dunlap
2012-07-04 12:52           ` Jan Beulich
2012-07-04 12:56             ` George Dunlap
2012-07-04 13:01               ` Jan Beulich
2012-07-04 13:30               ` Stefano Stabellini
2012-07-04 14:09                 ` Jan Beulich
2012-07-04 15:09                   ` Stefano Stabellini
2012-07-06 14:36                     ` John Haxby
2012-07-06 16:39                 ` Matthew Allen
2012-07-06 17:24                   ` George Dunlap
2012-06-29 10:01   ` George Dunlap
2012-06-29 15:48     ` Thomas Goirand [this message]
2012-07-02 13:59     ` Ian Campbell
2012-07-02 15:13       ` Alan Cox
2012-07-03 11:12       ` George Dunlap
2012-07-03 14:18         ` Stefano Stabellini
2012-08-23 10:37 ` Ian Campbell
2012-08-23 10:37   ` [PATCH 1/6] Clarify what info predisclosure list members may share during an embargo Ian Campbell
2012-08-23 10:37   ` [PATCH 2/6] Clarifications to predisclosure list subscription instructions Ian Campbell
2012-08-23 10:37   ` [PATCH 3/6] Clarify the scope of the process to just the hypervisor project Ian Campbell
2012-08-23 10:37   ` [PATCH 4/6] Discuss post-embargo disclosure of potentially controversial private decisions Ian Campbell
2012-08-23 10:37   ` [PATCH 5/6] Patch review, expert advice and targetted fixes Ian Campbell
2012-08-23 10:37   ` [PATCH 6/6] Declare version 1.3 Ian Campbell
2012-09-24 11:25   ` Security vulnerability process, and CVE-2012-0217 [vote?] Lars Kurth
2012-10-01 16:38     ` Ian Jackson
2012-10-03 17:03       ` Lars Kurth
2012-10-04  8:39       ` Lars Kurth
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2012-07-02 15:24 Security vulnerability process, and CVE-2012-0217 John Creol

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