From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754091Ab2GINxV (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jul 2012 09:53:21 -0400 Received: from mailout-de.gmx.net ([213.165.64.22]:47981 "HELO mailout-de.gmx.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with SMTP id S1753761Ab2GINxS (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jul 2012 09:53:18 -0400 X-Authenticated: #5108953 X-Provags-ID: V01U2FsdGVkX1+x8NcYm/ex8Kj6TFYYXXECAez+I1Ufe1acA2jSWQ YUboCiEE9RuZvv Message-ID: <4FFAE24A.2070404@gmx.de> Date: Mon, 09 Jul 2012 15:53:14 +0200 From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Toralf_F=F6rster?= User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:13.0) Gecko/20120625 Thunderbird/13.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Theodore Ts'o" CC: Linux Kernel Subject: "random PID" - worth to be considered (again) ? X-Enigmail-Version: 1.5pre Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Y-GMX-Trusted: 0 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org After reading [1] I'm wondering whether these would at least improve OpenSSL's implementation of a RSA key generator (page 13 in [1]) ? /me knows about the security-by-obscurity discussion like in [2], however here I do not speak about guessing next PID, but about the described entropy hole. [1] https://factorable.net/weakkeys12.extended.pdf [2] http://marc.info/?t=94754302700001&r=1&w=2 -- MfG/Sincerely Toralf Förster pgp finger print: 7B1A 07F4 EC82 0F90 D4C2 8936 872A E508 7DB6 9DA3