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Tue, 15 Apr 2025 02:41:28 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <4dd5ada8-32e7-4b94-b2a4-51b20e09eb79@suse.com> Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 11:41:27 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] x86/hvm: fix handling of accesses to partial r/o MMIO pages To: =?UTF-8?Q?Roger_Pau_Monn=C3=A9?= Cc: Andrew Cooper , xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Marek Marczykowski References: <20250411105411.22334-1-roger.pau@citrix.com> <20250411105411.22334-4-roger.pau@citrix.com> <7c3c91d9-4de8-4910-b26e-8782a0f0d364@suse.com> Content-Language: en-US From: Jan Beulich Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@suse.com; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit On 15.04.2025 10:34, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Tue, Apr 15, 2025 at 09:32:37AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 14.04.2025 18:13, Roger Pau Monné wrote: >>> On Mon, Apr 14, 2025 at 05:24:32PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 14.04.2025 15:53, Roger Pau Monné wrote: >>>>> On Mon, Apr 14, 2025 at 08:33:44AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>> I'm also concerned of e.g. VT-x'es APIC access MFN, which is >>>>>> p2m_mmio_direct. >>>>> >>>>> But that won't go into hvm_hap_nested_page_fault() when using >>>>> cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses (and thus having an APIC page >>>>> mapped as p2m_mmio_direct)? >>>>> >>>>> It would instead be an EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS vmexit which is handled >>>>> differently? >>>> >>>> All true as long as things work as expected (potentially including the guest >>>> also behaving as expected). Also this was explicitly only an example I could >>>> readily think of. I'm simply wary of handle_mmio_with_translation() now >>>> getting things to handle it's not meant to ever see. >>> >>> How was access to MMIO r/o regions supposed to be handled before >>> 33c19df9a5a0 (~2015)? I see that setting r/o MMIO p2m entries was >>> added way before to p2m_type_to_flags() and ept_p2m_type_to_flags() >>> (~2010), yet I can't figure out how writes would be handled back then >>> that didn't result in a p2m fault and crashing of the domain. >> >> Was that handled at all before said change? > > Not really AFAICT, hence me wondering how where write accesses to r/o > MMIO regions supposed to be handled by (non-priv) domains. Was the > expectation that those writes trigger an p2m violation thus crashing > the domain? I think so, yes. Devices with such special areas weren't (aren't?) supposed to be handed to DomU-s. >> mmio_ro_do_page_fault() was >> (and still is) invoked for the hardware domain only, and quite likely >> the need for handling (discarding) writes for PVHv1 had been overlooked >> until someone was hit by the lack thereof. > > I see, I didn't realize r/o MMIO was only handled for PV hardware > domains only. I could arguably do the same for HVM in > hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(). > > Not sure whether the subpage stuff is supposed to be functional for > domains different than the hardware domain? It seems to be available > to the hanrdware domain only for PV guests, while for HVM is available > for both PV and HVM domains: DYM Dom0 and DomU here? > is_hardware_domain(currd) || subpage_mmio_write_accept(mfn, gla) > > In hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(). See the three XHCI_SHARE_* modes. When it's XHCI_SHARE_ANY, even DomU-s would require this handling. It looks like a mistake that we permit the path to be taken for DomU-s even when the mode is XHCI_SHARE_HWDOM. It also looks like a mistake that the PV path has remained Dom0-only, even in the XHCI_SHARE_ANY case. Cc-ing Marek once again ... >>> I'm happy to look at other ways to handling this, but given there's >>> current logic for handling accesses to read-only regions in >>> hvm_hap_nested_page_fault() I think re-using that was the best way to >>> also handle accesses to MMIO read-only regions. >>> >>> Arguably it would already be the case that for other reasons Xen would >>> need to emulate an instruction that accesses a read-only MMIO region? >> >> Aiui hvm_translate_get_page() will yield HVMTRANS_bad_gfn_to_mfn for >> p2m_mmio_direct (after all, "direct" means we expect no emulation is >> needed; while arguably wrong for the introspection case, I'm not sure >> that and pass-through actually go together). Hence it's down to >> hvmemul_linear_mmio_access() -> hvmemul_phys_mmio_access() -> >> hvmemul_do_mmio_buffer() -> hvmemul_do_io_buffer() -> hvmemul_do_io(), >> which means that if hvm_io_intercept() can't handle it, the access >> will be forwarded to the responsible DM, or be "processed" by the >> internal null handler. >> >> Given this, perhaps what you do is actually fine. At the same time >> note how several functions in hvm/emulate.c simply fail upon >> encountering p2m_mmio_direct. These are all REP handlers though, so >> the main emulator would then try emulating the insn the non-REP way. > > I'm open to alternative ways of handling such accesses, just used what > seemed more natural in the context of hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(). > > Emulation of r/o MMIO accesses failing wouldn't be an issue from Xen's > perspective, that would "just" result in the guest getting a #GP > injected. That's not the part I'm worried about. What worries me is that we open up another (or better: we're widening a) way to hit the emulator in the first place. (Plus, as said, the issue with the not really tidy P2M type system.) > Would you like me to add some of your reasoning above to the commit > message? While I'd still be a little hesitant as to ack-ing of the result, I think that's all I'm really asking for, yes. Jan