From: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: optionally disable brk()
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 12:03:27 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4f0b1f0e-ab26-cd4e-607c-2c5b9933f10a@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201005082239.GQ4555@dhcp22.suse.cz>
On 5.10.2020 11.22, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Mon 05-10-20 11:11:35, Topi Miettinen wrote:
> [...]
>> I think hardened, security oriented systems should disable brk() completely
>> because it will increase the randomization of the process address space
>> (ASLR). This wouldn't be a good option to enable for systems where maximum
>> compatibility with legacy software is more important than any hardening.
>
> I believe we already do have means to filter syscalls from userspace for
> security hardened environements. Or is there any reason to duplicate
> that and control during the configuration time?
This is true, but seccomp can't be used for cases where NoNewPrivileges
can't be enabled (setuid/setgid binaries present which sadly is still
often the case even in otherwise hardened system), so it's typically not
possible to install a filter for the whole system.
-Topi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-05 9:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-02 17:19 [PATCH] mm: optionally disable brk() Topi Miettinen
2020-10-02 17:52 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-10-02 21:19 ` David Laight
2020-10-02 21:44 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-05 6:12 ` Michal Hocko
2020-10-05 8:11 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-05 8:22 ` Michal Hocko
2020-10-05 9:03 ` Topi Miettinen [this message]
2020-10-05 14:12 ` Jonathan Corbet
2020-10-05 16:14 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-05 9:13 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-10-05 9:20 ` Michal Hocko
2020-10-05 9:47 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-05 9:55 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-10-05 11:21 ` David Laight
2020-10-05 12:18 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-10-05 12:25 ` David Laight
2020-10-07 9:43 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-01 11:41 ` Topi Miettinen
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